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Part 1:  The Impact of Female Empowerment on Men’s Extramarital Sexual 
Behavior:  Evidence from West Africa 
 
Improving women's bargaining power to negotiate safer sex with their partner is 
widely seen as fundamental to reducing women's vulnerability to HIV infection, 
although little causal evidence has been provided. This paper uses exogenous 
variation in a determinant of female bargaining power, women's kin support, to 
identify the causal effect of women's empowerment on men's extramarital sexual 
behavior. I establish the relevance of kin support shocks for measures of bargaining 
power such as women's reported decision-making authority over major and daily 
household purchases, women's healthcare, and household cooking decisions. Reduced 
form estimates indicate that having one more adult male sibling alive leads to a 
decrease of 1.3 percent in the probability of her husband's extramarital behavior. 
However, the number of living adult female siblings does not influence her husband's 
behavior. A measure of shocks to kin support, captured by the death of a woman's 
young siblings, is shown to increase her husband's extramarital behavior. The kin 
support measures are balanced across observables and results are robust to excluding 
households in which women's relatives reside, as well as alternate definitions of the 
kin support measures. This suggests that a woman's bargaining power within the 
household does influence the likelihood of her husband's extramarital sexual 
behavior, and thus her risk of contracting a sexually transmitted disease. 
  
Part 2:  Kin Support, Female Bargaining Power, and Fertility 
Do decreases in a woman's bargaining power relative to her husband lead to higher 
fertility? This paper attempts to answer this question in the context of West Africa 
using shocks over time to a determinant of a woman's bargaining power, her kin 
support, to identify the causal effect. Kin support shocks are captured by deaths of a 
woman's young siblings, which are argued to be an indication that the woman's natal 
family has suffered a negative shock. The shocks are shown to be relevant across 
couples for women's reported household decision-making authority. I exploit 
differences in the timing of the shocks across couples over time to estimate how 
changes in a woman's bargaining power impact a couple's fertility. A couple is on 
average 2.5 percentage points more likely to have a child in any given year after the 
woman has experienced an additional post-marriage young sibling death. The effect is 
robust to removing village-year and country-cohort-year effects among other controls. 
Analysis of the dynamics of fertility changes relative to the timing of the shocks 
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 In his seminal work Development as Freedom, Amartya Sen argues for a 
conception of development based on the expansion of individual freedoms and the 
realization of human capabilities.  Such freedoms include the opportunity to live a 
long life; to obtain an education, seek and find employment, own property, and have a 
say in household decisions; the freedom from violence or coercion; and to choose 
one’s spouse and family size. While some freedoms have expanded as average 
income has grown, Sen argues many freedoms are governed by political forces, or 
social arrangements such as the division of resources and responsibilities within the 
household. As a result, progress in development must ultimately be evaluated on the 
basis of achieving these freedoms for everyone, rather than on a more narrow focus 
on the growth of average income. 
 The current state of women’s well-being and freedom along several 
dimensions underscores the importance of being mindful of this broader conception 
of development.  Improvements in average household income obscure persistent 
inequities in the welfare of men and women in the household.  While women’s 
education and labor force participation have increased in tandem with income growth 




income growth (WDR, 2012).   For example, excess female mortality
1
 for women and 
girls has been invariant to average income growth in low and middle income 
countries over the period 1990 to 2008 (Figure 1.1) and remains orders of magnitude 
higher in these countries relative to high-income countries (Table 1.1) (WDR, 2012; 
Anderson and Ray, 2010).  Most starkly, excess female mortality has increased ten-
fold over this period in the high HIV-prevalence countries of sub-Saharan Africa.   
 In addition to disadvantages in health outcomes, women continue to face 
violence and limited decision-making authority in the household.  A World Health 
Organization study of intimate partner violence in ten countries found that between 
10 and 69 percent of women report being physically abused at least once in their 
lifetime, with comparable proportions reporting attempted forced sex by an intimate 
partner in their lifetime (Harvey et al., 2007).  These rates vary widely across 
countries and often not significantly with household wealth or income (Hindin et al., 
2008;  WDR, 2012).  Large proportions of women also continue to have no say in 
how their own income is spent (Figure 1.2) or in household decisions (Kishor and 
Subaiya, 2008).  These indicators of women’s decision-making authority appear also 
not to improve with household wealth once controlling for other characteristics 
(Kishor and Subaiya, 2008). 
 Building on the notion of development as freedom, Sen went on to argue that 
freedom represents not only the ends of development, but also its means.  That is, the 
further expansion of individual freedom and human capability is itself a function of 
the free agency of people (Sen, 1999).  In this view, the deprivations women face in 
                                                 
1
 Excess female deaths are defined as the number of women who would not have died had 
they had the same likelihood of dying relative to men as women in high-income countries do 




the areas discussed above not only represent a failure of development in and of 
themselves, but also foregone opportunities for further development in these and 
other areas.  This view is shared by the international development community as 
embodied in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in which promoting gender 
equality and the empowerment of women represents one of the eight goals, which is 
in turn widely seen as instrumental in achieving the goals of universal primary 
education (MDG 2), reduction of under-five mortality (MDG 4), improvement in 
maternal health (MDG 5), and a reduction in the likelihood of contracting HIV/AIDS 
(MDG 6) (UNDP, 2006). 
 The extent to which women’s empowerment serves as a catalyst for their own 
development, that of their children, and other development goals is an empirical 
question.  Support for the instrumental nature of women’s empowerment reflected in 
Sen (1999) and the MDGs is based in part on a body of empirical work arguing for a 
link between various proposed measures of women’s agency and various household 
outcomes.  Examples include Thomas (1990), who finds that unearned income in 
women’s control leads to substantial improvements in child survival probabilities and 
the nutritional status of daughters in Brazil.  In a study of Indonesia, Beegle et al. 
(2001) find that a woman with a larger share of household assets in her control, or a 
higher level of education than her husband, is more likely to obtain prenatal care and 
other modern reproductive health services.  Duflo (2003) studies the gender of the 
recipient of a cash transfer due to the expansion of an old-age pension program in 
South Africa.  Duflo finds that pensions received by grandmothers had large 




on boys, and no effect due to pensions received by men.  Lundberg et al. (1997) find 
similarly that a policy change in the United Kingdom in which a child allowance was 
transferred to wives resulted in greater expenditure on children’s clothing. 
 While the findings of these and similar studies overall are suggestive of a 
causal relationship between women’s empowerment and development outcomes, the 
difficulty of finding exogenous variation in women’s empowerment renders drawing 
inferences challenging and subject to omitted variable bias, perhaps less so in those 
studies able to utilize experimental or quasi-experimental evidence (e.g. Ashraf et al., 
2010; Duflo, 2003; and Lundberg et al., 1997). 
Observed measures of women’s bargaining power in the household such as 
differences in a husband and wife’s education or share of asset ownership may be 
endogenous as couples may pair on the marriage market on the basis of these factors 
in a manner correlated with outcomes.  Other unobserved differences across couples 
such as social norms governing women’s status and household behavior may frustrate 
causal interpretation as well.  Yet despite these econometric challenges, estimating 
the causal relationship of women’s empowerment on development outcomes has 
important implications for how development challenges are approached.  That is, if 
improvement in women’s empowerment, while a worthwhile objective per se, does 
not contribute to reducing high rates of unwanted fertility, intimate partner violence, 
malnutrition, or the excess mortality of women and girls, then efforts must be directed 
toward solutions which address these deprivations by other means. 
This dissertation seeks to contribute to this body of literature by estimating the 




intimately linked to her freedom over her body, her health, her labor, and quality of 
life.  Specifically, in Chapter 2, I explore whether a change in a woman’s bargaining 
power during her marriage influences her husband’s extramarital sexual behavior 
using data on couples in West Africa.  Many development practitioners and 
researchers believe that women are unable to protect themselves from their husband’s 
risky sexual behavior and resulting sexually transmitted diseases (STD), because they 
lack bargaining power in their relationship.  Such a possibility is particularly serious 
in the context of the high HIV rates of sub-Saharan Africa.  While HIV rates in West 
Africa are relatively low, rates have been rising in recent years rendering such a 
vulnerability for women precarious.   In Chapter 3, I study the effects of women’s 
empowerment on a couple’s fertility.  West Africa has among the highest rates of 
births per women and rates of maternal mortality in the world.  Understanding 
whether changes in women’s empowerment affect fertility has implications for 
strategies designed to reduce maternal mortality in the region.  Estimation in both 
chapters uses data on couples in eight West African countries pooled from households 
surveyed in the Demographic and Health Surveys. 
 In Chapter 2, the causal effect of women’s empowerment on men’s 
extramarital behavior is identified using shocks to a determinant of a woman’s 
bargaining power, her kin support.  Traditional sources of social support such as 
kinship have been argued to affect bargaining strength in the household and to be 
especially important for women.  Kin support is argued to be particularly relevant in 
the context of sub-Saharan Africa due to the importance of kin relations relative to 




bargaining power in this context due in part to anthropological evidence indicating 
the separate nature of husbands’ and wives’ kin relations.  
 Specifically, variation in a woman’s bargaining power induced by shocks to 
her kin support is captured by the deaths of a woman’s siblings during her marriage.  
I present two measures of shocks to kin support based on the surviving number of 
living adult male siblings a woman has, and the deaths of a woman’s younger 
siblings.  The generally patriarchal societies of West Africa render adult male family 
member’s support most critical.  Deaths of a woman’s young siblings during her 
marriage serve as indication her natal family has suffered a negative shock.   
 I demonstrate the negative effect of these shocks to kin support for measures 
of a woman’s decision-making authority over major and daily household purchases, 
her healthcare, and household cooking decisions.  Reduced form results indicate that 
having one more adult male sibling alive leads to a decrease of about 1 percent in the 
probability of her husband’s extramarital behavior.  This effect represents 10 percent 
of the sample mean for men’s extramarital behavior.  Results are similar using the 
deaths of young siblings as shocks to kin support.  Both kin support measures are 
shown to be balanced across observables and robust to excluding households in which 
women’s relatives reside, along with alternative definitions of the kin support 
measures.  Finally, a falsification exercise demonstrates that the deaths of a woman’s 
adult female siblings do not affect her husband’s behavior.  An instrumental variable 
estimation is eschewed in favor of reduced form estimates due to the likely violation 
of the exclusion restriction due to the noisy measurement of bargaining power in the 




does influence the likelihood of her husband’s extramarital behavior, and therefore 
her risk of contracting an STD. 
 In Chapter 3, I explore whether decreases in a woman’s bargaining power 
relative to her husband over the course of her marriage affect the couple’s fertility.  I 
utilize a richer dimension of the data set in Chapter 2 to address this question by 
constructing a panel based on a time series of a woman’s births and sibling deaths 
constructed from her retrospective fertility and sibling histories.  Such an approach 
serves as a contribution to the empirical literature on the topic by restricting 
identification to shifts in bargaining power within couples over time, as opposed to 
across couples.  This strategy allows for the inclusion of couple fixed effects to 
control for unobserved time-invariant differences across couples which have risked 
confounding inference in previous studies in the literature.  Exploiting differences in 
the timing of kin support shocks for women over time, I estimate that a couple is 2.5 
percentage points more likely to have a child in any given year after the woman has 
experienced an additional sibling death.  The effect is shown to be robust to removing 
village-year and country-cohort-year effects among other controls.  Examining the 
dynamics of fertility changes before and after the timing of the kin support shocks 













Figure 1.1:  Changes in Excess Female Mortality vs. Income Growth in Low and 
Middle Income Countries 1990 - 2008 
 
Source:  World Bank (2012) 
 
Table 1.1:  Global Estimates of Excess Female Mortality for 1990 and 2008 
 












Figure 1.2:  Women’s control over own income 
 








The Impact of Female Empowerment on Male Extramarital 
Sexual Behavior: Evidence from West Africa 
 
2.1  Introduction 
In 2004, The Economist claimed "Men tend to contract HIV because of things 
they have done; women are more likely to contract it because of things that have been 
done to them."
2
  It is widely believed that a significant factor leading to a high 
infection rate for women in sub-Saharan Africa is their husband's high-risk sexual 
behavior.
3
  Men become infected through sexual encounters with someone other than 
their spouse or live-in partner and in turn infect their partner at home.  Many 
development practitioners and researchers believe that women are unable to protect 
themselves from their partner's behavior in part due to their poor bargaining position 
within the household (Carpenter et. al., 1999; Tlou, 2002; Varga, 1999).  A woman 
may be unable to condition her relationship on her partner's safe sexual practices, 
because she risks violence, financial hardship, or social sanction.  As a result, the 
empowerment of women has become an important component of the response to 
combat HIV in sub-Saharan Africa in addition to being an important development 
objective in and of itself (UNAIDS, UNFPA, and UNIFEM, 2004).  Yet, there has 
                                                 
2
The Economist, 11/27/2004, Vol. 373 Issue 8403, p82-83 
3
Physiological factors may also serve to explain the high rate of female infection.  The 
transmission of HIV from men to women has been argued to be more efficient than women to 
men (Kristensen et. al., 2002).  Though Gray et.al. (2001) do not find statistically significant 
differences in transmission rates. 
For discussion of male extramarital behavior as a source of infection for women see 






been little empirical work attempting to establish a causal relationship between 
female bargaining power and men's high-risk sexual behavior and to estimate the size 
of the effect.  This study attempts to fill this gap by studying the relationship between 
bargaining power, as proxied by shocks to a woman's kin network, and her husband's 
extramarital relations. 
Previous studies have reported associations between measures of low female 
bargaining power and high-risk male sexual behavior within relationships in various 
sub-Saharan African countries.
4
 While these associations are robust to the inclusion 
of controls for various couple characteristics, these studies are unlikely to establish a 
causal relationship because they cannot adequately account for omitted variable bias 
and simultaneity bias.  Omitted variable bias could confound analysis if, for example, 
unobserved social norms govern both women's status in the household and acceptable 
male sexual behavior.  Individual unobserved characteristics may also confound 
causal interpretation if certain types of men and women match together in the 
marriage market.  Simultaneity bias may result if the husband's sexual behavior and 
the woman's power in the household are jointly determined through an implicit 
negotiation.  For example, a man may cede control over household decisions to his 
wife in an implicit exchange for less scrutiny of his extramarital relations.  This paper 
will attempt to circumvent these identification problems by exploiting post-marriage 
shocks to a determinant of female bargaining power, kin support, which provides 
                                                 
4
For example, Langen (2005) find that dependent women are less likely to suggest condom 
use and their male partners are more likely to refuse condom use.  Dunkle et. al. (2004) find 
that South African women in relationships with a high degree of male control are more likely 
to be HIV positive.  The authors hypothesize that the men in such relationships are more 






variation which is unlikely to be correlated with factors driving male sexual behavior 
except through women's bargaining power. 
Traditional sources of social support such as kinship have been argued to 
impact bargaining strength within the household and to be especially important for 
women (Agarwal, 1997).  Kinship support has been shown to serve as a source of 
implicit insurance perhaps due to the greater trust among kin (Rosenzweig, 1988; 
Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989).  In a study of households in Cote d'Ivoire, Grimard 
(1997) finds evidence of partial insurance among households of the same ethnic 
group which he argues may be a proxy for lineage or kinship group.  Jacoby and 
Mansuri (2008) note the role of a woman’s brother in protecting her from 
mistreatment via a bride exchange custom between families in rural Pakistan.   Kin 
support is also especially relevant for female bargaining power in sub-Saharan Africa 
as several anthropological studies have highlighted the importance of kinship 
relations relative to conjugal relations (Potash, 1995; Abu, 1983; Caldwell and 
Caldwell, 1987).  As Potash (1995) noted, "African families are based on the 
enduring, separate kinship ties of husbands and wives."  Spouses often maintain 
separate budgets and women and their children may be even regarded as a separate 
economic unit from the husband (Caldwell and Caldwell, 1987).
 5
  For men, financial 
responsibilities to kin may supersede those to the marital unit. 
The separate nature of kin support in sub-Saharan Africa and its importance 
suggests that intrahousehold bargaining power is affected by kin support in two ways.  
                                                 
5
 Lesthaeghe (1989) documents that child fosterage is a common form of kin support in West 
Africa allowing the costs child rearing to be spread within a kin group.  Given the burden of 
caring for children on the mother’s income, the practice of child fosterage can be especially 




First, a decrease in a woman's kin support can worsen her outside option by damaging 
her fall-back source of support should the marriage dissolve or become 
uncooperative.  With a worsened outside option, a woman may be less able to 
demand better outcomes within the relationship.  Secondly, given that kinship ties 
may involve financial transfers, shocks to this network directly affect the income 
within her control and hence her bargaining power vis-a-vis her husband.
6
  
The implied model of the couple’s behavior is a cooperative bargaining model 
where surplus within marriage can be thought to be divided according to a Nash 
bargaining solution in which the threat point may be divorce as in the seminal work 
of McElroy and Horney (1981) or an uncooperative outcome within marriage as in 
the separate-spheres model of Lundberg and Pollack (1993).  Shocks to a woman’s 
kin support affect her utility at the relevant threat point and affect outcomes within 
marriage as a result.  
Two measures of kin support are presented.  First, the current number of 
living adult male siblings at least 20 years old, will serve as a measure of a woman's 
current level of kin support.  The generally patriarchal societies of West Africa render 
male family member's support most critical.
7
  Secondly, the post-marriage deaths of a 
woman's young siblings under age 20 are used to capture negative shocks to a 
woman's natal family.  While HIV prevalence is low across West Africa, deaths are 
                                                 
6
 In addition to the loss of an future income sharing due to a deceased sibling, the direct costs 
of deaths associated with funeral expenses have been shown to be significant in many 
countries and particularly onerous in sub-Saharan Africa. For example, Case et al. (2008) and 
Case and Menendez (2009) document that funeral expenses in South Africa can cost on 
average the equivalent of one year of median income.  
7
The vast majority of couples in this study belong to ethnic groups characterized as patrilineal 
such as the Ewe, Hausa, Fulani, Igbo, and Yoruba (Murdock, 1967).  A sizeable ethnic group 
with matrilineal orientation in West Africa is the Akan which generally live in Ghana and 




restricted to siblings under the age of 20 in this measure in order to ensure that the 
deaths are not due to sexually transmitted HIV, which might then be correlated with 
the husband's sexual behavior.
8
  Only sibling deaths after the woman's marriage are 
included in the measure in order to avoid the possibility that the outcomes of these 
shocks were a consideration in marriage decisions.  Likewise, fixed effects for the 
number of siblings eligible to become living adult male siblings after the woman's 
marriage are included so that the variation in the current number of living adult male 
siblings is due to deaths.  Controlling for the number of siblings also serves to 
account for socioeconomic characteristics that may be associated with sibship size. 
I measure kin support and shocks to a woman's natal family using the birth 
and death history of a woman's siblings in the Demographic and Health Surveys 
(DHS).  The sample used in the analysis consists of couples pooled from DHS 
surveys in the West African countries of Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Guinea, 
Liberia, Mali, Niger, and Senegal.  West Africa is chosen due to the relatively low 
HIV prevalence of the region, which avoids that sibling mortality is correlated with 
HIV prevalence and in turn male sexual behavior.  A focus on West Africa is also of 
independent interest as prevalence rates have been rising in some countries such as 
Cameroon and Gabon (UNAIDS, 2008).  Understanding the dynamics of HIV 
transmission and barriers to change in sexual behavior in this region may inform 
policy prior to any further increase in HIV prevalence. 
                                                 
8
One may still be concerned that the deaths of siblings under the age of 20 may be correlated 
with sexually transmitted HIV prevalence due to mother-to-child transmission of the virus.  
Child mortality due to HIV in West Africa, however, is uncommon representing only 2.8 






I show that the kin support measures are balanced across observables which 
are fixed at the time of the couple's marriage.  I also find no effect of the measures on 
the likelihood the husband or woman knows someone who has died of AIDS.  Nor is 
the husband's knowledge of HIV and prevention methods predicted by the kin support 
measures. These results suggest the kin support measures are not affecting the 
husband through HIV-related channels.  I also verify that the results are robust to 
excluding households from the sample which can be identified as containing the 
woman's relatives, where this concern would be very important. 
Next I demonstrate the relevance of the kin support measures for a measure of 
female bargaining power.  An indicator variable for female bargaining power is 
constructed from a woman's response in the DHS survey regarding whether she has 
some say over major household purchases.  The literature on the determinants of 
female bargaining power has highlighted control over economic resources as a critical 
factor (Anderson and Eswaran, 2009; Kantor, 2003; Friedberg and Webb, 2006).  
This paper benefits from a survey question which directly measures a woman's 
control over important economic decisions of the household.  The regression of the 
female bargaining power measure on the kin support measure confirms a negative 
relationship with young sibling deaths and a positive relationship with the number of 
living adult male siblings.  This relationship is robust to the inclusion of several 
controls including village-level fixed effects, number of sibling fixed effects, couple 
and household characteristics, and characteristics of the woman's natal family.   I also 
demonstrate the expected relationship between the kin support measures and alternate 




The validity of the kin support measures as a bargaining power shifter is 
explored further.  If unobserved socioeconomic characteristics of the couple 
accounted for the correlation between sibling mortality and female bargaining power, 
then the correlation should exist for both adult female sibling and adult male sibling 
mortality.  Tests indicate that there is no statistically significant relationship between 
the number of living adult female siblings and the female bargaining power measure 
unlike for living adult male siblings.  Furthermore, if the young sibling mortality 
measure is to have the interpretation of a negative shock to the woman's natal family 
then we should observe that the deaths of siblings of both genders have an impact.
9
  
For example, infant siblings of both genders would be at risk from income shocks to 
the natal family.  I verify that indeed both male and female young sibling deaths have 
a statistically significant relationship with the female bargaining power measure.  
These results lend credence to my hypothesis. 
Finally, I test for the causal relationship of interest and assess whether a 
woman with lower bargaining power is more likely to have a husband who engages in 
high-risk sexual behavior.  A measure of men's high-risk sexual behavior is 
constructed from men's survey responses regarding whether they have had 
extramarital partners in the last 12 months.  Extramarital behavior is studied given 
evidence that multiple concurrent partnerships increase the speed of transmission, 
prevalence, and persistence of HIV in a population (Mah and Halperin, 2010). 
An instrumental variable approach would have been preferred, but given the 
                                                 
9
Male and female infant mortality rates are similar in West Africa with mortality slightly 







limits of the bargaining power variable I had at hand, the exclusion restriction was 
unlikely to be satisfied.  A causal relationship between female bargaining power and 
male extramarital sexual behavior is thus assessed by examining the reduced form 
effects of the kin support measures on the male extramarital partner indicator.  Given 
evidence that the kin support measures affect female bargaining power and are 
unlikely to be correlated with male sexual behavior through other channels, causality 
can be inferred from these reduced form estimates.  The results indicate that an 
increase in female bargaining power results in a decrease in the likelihood a woman's 
husband takes an extramarital partner.  In terms of the kin support measures, a young 
sibling death results in a 1.3 percent increase in the likelihood the husband has taken 
an extramarital partner.  On the other hand, another living adult male sibling results in 
a 1.3 percent decrease in the likelihood of an extramarital partner.  In terms of the 
standard deviation of the kin support measures within villages, a one standard 
deviation increase in young sibling deaths or living adult male siblings results in a 0.4 
percent increase and decrease respectively in the likelihood of extramarital behavior.  
Living adult female siblings do not display any statistically significant relationship 
with extramarital behavior. 
As a final robustness check, I restrict my attention to only recent sibling 
deaths which allows the exclusion of a potentially endogenous variable as a needed 
control (marriage duration). 
The paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2,  I describe the empirical 
strategy that will be used to identify the causal effect of female bargaining power on 




study.  Results are presented in Section 4 along with tests of the exogeneity of the kin 
support measures.  Section 5 provides further robustness checks followed by 
concluding remarks. 
 
2.2  Empirical Strategy 
The causal relationship of interest is represented in equation (1):       
                              	 =  + 	 + 	 + 	                                  (1) 
A binary variable indicating whether the husband in couple  has extramarital 
partners, 	, is a function of the wife's bargaining power, 	, and a 
vector of covariates, 	.  This structural equation indicates how a change in the 
bargaining power of the female, once the union has been formed, would influence her 
partner's sexual behavior. 
Straightforward estimation of equation (1) is unlikely to lead to the estimation 
of the desired structural parameter for two reasons:  first, bargaining power is likely 
to be endogenously determined and second, "bargaining power" is not directly 
observed.  Whether or not  is precisely measured or simply proxied, OLS 
estimation of equation (1) would be unlikely to produce a causal estimate of the effect 
of female bargaining power on the husband's extramarital sexual behavior due to the 
presence of omitted variable and simultaneity bias.  For example, it could be that 
norms governing acceptable roles for women may also determine appropriate male 
sexual behavior.  Introducing village fixed effects may mitigate the concern as long as 
norms are shared within a geographic entity.  To the extent that such norms would 




Individual unobserved characteristics comprise the other class of important potential 
omitted variables. Such characteristics may work through the marriage market to pair 
certain types of males and females. For example, men with a preference for multiple 
partners may marry "submissive" women willing to tolerate lower levels of decision-
making power.  Such matching may produce the spurious appearance that lower 
female bargaining power causes men's high-risk sexual behavior.  Additionally, 
simultaneity bias may result if the man's sexual behavior and the woman's say in 
household financial decisions are jointly determined through an implicit bargaining 
process.  For example, the husband may cede household decisions to the wife in 
exchange for autonomy in his sexual decisions.  In this instance, greater female 
bargaining power would falsely appear to cause an increase in the likelihood the 
husband has extramarital partners.
10
   
 
2.2.1  Kin Support 
Given these possible sources of bias, the use of exogenous variation in 
bargaining power would appear to be warranted.  An exogenous proxy for bargaining 
power is constructed from shocks to a determinant of female bargaining power, kin 
support.  As discussed above, kin support is particularly suited as a bargaining power 
shifter given both the importance of traditional sources of social support for women, 
and also the separate nature of spouses' kinship ties in sub-Saharan Africa.   
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 Table A.1 shows OLS regressions of an indicator for male extramarital behavior on 
women’s say over major household purchases.  The simple regressions are in the same 
direction as the reduced form and IV estimates, but smaller in size and not significantly 
different from zero unlike the reduced form estimates.  This suggests that OLS may be 




This paper will utilize the birth and death history of a woman's siblings in the 
DHS to create two measures of a woman's kin support to serve as measures for 
female bargaining power.  First, the current number of living adult male siblings of 
the woman at least 20 years old, , will capture her current level of kin 
support.  The generally patriarchal societies of West Africa render adult male sibling's 
support more critical than adult female siblings.  Fixed effects for the number of male 
siblings who were born at least 20 years earlier, and had not died before the couple's 
marriage, will be included as controls in regressions.  This set of siblings represents 
those who were eligible after the woman's marriage to become one of the woman's 
current living adult male siblings.  By controlling for these eligible male siblings, 
only variation in  for women with the same number of eligible siblings is 
used for identification.  Variation within such groups in the current number of living 
adult male siblings is determined only by post-marriage deaths.  Restricting variation 
in the level of kin support to this source limits correlation with characteristics of the 
woman's natal family such as its fertility which may confound analysis.   
Second, the number of post-marriage deaths of a woman's young siblings 
under the age of 20, ℎ, will measure negative shocks to a woman's natal 
family and hence shocks to her kin support.  As discussed above, measuring kin 
support shocks with young sibling deaths avoids that the deaths are due to HIV and 
thus avoids any potential that results are due to invalid correlation with the HIV-
related determinants of male sexual behavior. As with the variation in ,  
only deaths after the woman's marriage are used to construct the young sibling deaths 




consideration in marriage decisions.  For example, negative kin support shocks may 
affect the dowry or bride price offered and the type of men and women who marry.  
The measure would then be invalid due to its potential correlation with unobserved 
characteristics of the man which may determine his likelihood of having extramarital 
partners.  Fixed effects for the number of young siblings at the time of the woman's 
marriage or born thereafter are included to restrict identification to variation within 
groups of women with the same number of eligible young siblings. 
Unlike adult male siblings, young siblings themselves are not conceived of 
here as sources of support but rather their deaths as proxies for negative shocks to kin 
support.
11
  Hence,  is measured as the number of living siblings to 
capture a level of support and ℎ measured as the number of deaths to 
capture shocks.  In the case of both measures, however, the inclusion of fixed effects 
for the number of eligible siblings after marriage restricts the variation used for 
identification to post-marriage deaths. 
 
2.2.2  Kin Support and Bargaining Power 
In order to assess whether these kin support measures function as bargaining 
power shifters, I estimate their effect on proxies for bargaining power drawn from 
women's reported decision-making authority in the DHS.  Following the literature on 
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 The argument can be made that while adult sibling deaths may cost the family money (e.g. 
due to funeral expenses), the death of child siblings may free up resources.  Therefore, in 
addition to serving as a proxy for a negative shocks on the natal families resources, the death 
of the child sibling may have a direct positive effect on the other siblings by freeing up 
resources.  The presence of such an effect would attenuate a negative effect of child sibling 
deaths on a woman’s bargaining power.  The balance of these effects and the value of child 





the effects of female bargaining power, this paper will focus on a measure of women's 
control over the household's important economic decisions to establish the relevance 
of the kin support measures for female bargaining power.  The DHS survey allows for 
a direct measure of this control which avoids having to rely on more remote 
determinants of this control.  Women are asked who has final say over major 
household purchases.  A binary variable is created from this question indicating 
whether the woman has some say in major household purchases.  Other survey 
responses indicating a woman's decision-making authority over her own health care, 
daily household purchases, and which food to be cooked each day will also be used as 
proxies for bargaining power to evaluate the relevance of the kin support measures 
for bargaining power. 
If the kin support measures affect female bargaining power, then a negative 
effect of ℎ and a positive effect of  should be observed on 
the woman's reported authority over important household decisions.  Specifically, in 
the case of young sibling deaths, I estimate equation (2) which displays the regression 
of the decision-making authority for the woman in couple  in village  with  
eligible siblings, 	 on the number of young sibling deaths, ℎ	 ,  
where 	 is a vector of controls;   village fixed effects; and  , fixed effects for the 
number, , of young siblings alive at the time of the woman's marriage or born 
subsequently.   
                        	 = ! + !ℎ	 + !	 + "	                         (2) 
The specification using 	 as the measure of kin support is equivalent 





 Finally, while kinship ties have been shown to be important sources of support 
in the developing country context, these benefits also come with obligations to 
reciprocate (Cox and Fafchamps, 2007; La Ferrara, 2007).  Moreover, the ability to 
derive benefits, and the obligation to bear costs from one’s social network varies 
across individuals.  For example, Goldstein et al. (2002) find that an individual’s 
inclusion in mutual insurance in Ghana was related to factors such as gender, wealth 
of household members, and anticipated land inheritance.  As a result, it is conceivable 
that for some women the death of kin may have an ambiguous effect on command 
over resources and bargaining power with her husband.  To the extent that sibling 
deaths have a positive effect on women’s bargaining power, the relevance of the kin 
support measures as negative shocks to bargaining power will be attenuated. 
Ultimately, this is an empirical question which can be tested as discussed below. 
 
2.2.3  Kin Support and Male Sexual Behavior 
While the kin support measures would appear to be an instrument for the 
structural equation (1) above, the fact that bargaining power is noisily captured in the 
data prevents the implementation of an instrumental variable strategy.  The DHS 
survey questions regarding women's decision-making power in the household are 
likely to capture only aspects of bargaining power.  The measurement error will 
contain other aspects of true bargaining power and will therefore be correlated with 
the true regressor as in non-classical measurement error (Hausmann, 2001).  Given 




captured by the proxy, the necessary exclusion restriction required for an instrumental 
variable strategy is unlikely to hold as the kin support measures will be correlated 
with the measurement error.,  Instrumental variables estimates in these circumstances 
will be inconsistent (Angrist and Imbens, 1991).
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  Nevertheless, for completeness, I 
include instrumental variable estimates in the appendix and discuss them in the results 
below.
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The causal effect of bargaining power on extramarital behavior is suggested 
by the reduced form effect of the kin support measures on 	 as 
displayed in equation (3) for ℎ	 with independent variables equivalent 
to equation (2) above. 
         	 = # + #ℎ	 + #	 +   +   + "	       (3) 
Establishing that the kin shocks represented by ℎ	 are negatively 
correlated with bargaining power and uncorrelated with other determinants of male 
extramarital behavior implies that a positive effect of ℎ	 on male 
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 In order to sign the bias from 2SLS estimates due to a violation of the exclusion restriction 
from the unobservability of true bargaining power, suppose that BP is only partially captured 
by say such that  =  +  and u is unobserved.  Furthermore, suppose that the kin 
support shocks impact the factors captured by u such that %&ℎ, |, ) <
0, but that otherwise the instrument is valid such that %&ℎ, ) = 0 and 
relevant for say in the expected direction such that ! < 0.   Inserting the expression for BP 
into Equation 1 yields  =  +  +  +  +   where the new 
error term is  + 	.   Adapting Equation 3.1 in Hahn and Hausman (2005), the sign of the 
large sample bias of 2SLS for the estimate of the effect of BP on extramarital, , is 
,-./0 − 2 = {%&! + !ℎ + ! ,  +  }.  
Simplifying yields ,-./0 − 2 = {!%&ℎ, )} = {}. 
Therefore, 2SLS will tend to bias the estimate of away from zero as the bias will be of the 
same sign as the parameter of interest.      
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 Factor analysis has been used by some researchers to attempt to create an index measuring 
true bargaining power (Ashraf et al., 2010; Fafchamps et al., 2009; Mabsout et al., 2010; Pitt 
et al., 2006; Varanasi ,2009.)  In this paper, I rely on reduced form estimates for causal 
inference instead of an instrumental variable approach using such an index derived from 
factor analysis out of a concern that the kin support shocks would still risk violation of the 




extramarital behavior can be interpreted as evidence of a negative impact of 
bargaining power on male extramarital behavior.  Likewise, a positive effect of living 
adult male siblings on bargaining power and a negative effect on male extramarital 
behavior would suggest a negative causal effect of bargaining power on extramarital 
behavior.  The reduced form equation of the effect of 	 on 
	 contains the same covariates as equation (3) with the exception of 
fixed effects for the number of eligible siblings for living adult male siblings. 
 
2.2.4  Key Covariates 
It is critical to identify and control for the sources of variation in the kin 
support measures to ensure that the measures impact male sexual behavior only 
through female bargaining power.  By construction, both ℎ and 
 vary with marital duration in the specifications above as the longer the 
couple has been married the more likely a post-marriage sibling death has occurred.  
Including marital duration as a control is necessary since marital duration may be 
correlated with the quality of the couple's marriage and hence the likelihood of 
extramarital behavior.  Similarly, bargaining power, sexual behavior, and age of 
siblings vary with age requiring the inclusion of age controls for the couple. 
Furthermore, ℎ is correlated with a woman's low birth order and 
the long birth-spacing of the woman's siblings.  Such women are more likely to have 
young siblings and therefore more likely to have young sibling deaths. As birth order 
and birth spacing may have also impacted the woman's marriage market outcomes or 




 will vary oppositely with birth order as a woman with higher birth order 
is more likely to have adult siblings.  The proportion of the woman's siblings who are 
male will of course be positively correlated with  and, as the gender 
distribution of the sibship may have affected marriage market outcomes, I include it 
as a control as well. 
Additionally, ℎ will be related to the correlates of infant and 
child mortality in West Africa.  Infant and child mortality of the woman's natal family 
may be related to the couple's socioeconomic status.  Some of the correlates of infant 
and child mortality in West Africa are short birth-spacing, age of mother, male gender 
of infant, parental education, poverty, access to health services, and geographic 
factors (Balk et. al., 2004).  While the birth-spacing and gender of the woman's 
siblings are observed in the DHS, the woman's parents' education, cultural factors, 
and the woman's natal family's access to health services and socioeconomic status are 
not observed.  I proxy for these unobserved characteristics by controlling for young 
sibling mortality prior to the couple's marriage.  Similarly to ℎ, I 
construct a variable for the number of young sibling deaths before marriage 
conditional on the number of siblings born before marriage.  To more directly 
measure child mortality, I also control for the proportion of the woman's siblings born 
before the couple's marriage who died before the age of 5.  Village fixed effects will 
capture geographic factors which correlate with the kin support measures and 
potentially male sexual behavior. 
Equations (2) and (3) above will be estimated in both sparse and more 




others.  In particular, I will also test whether results are robust to the inclusion of 
controls for household characteristics such as a household's wealth index derived 
from asset possession, as well as indicators for possession of electricity, television, 
and radio.  Characteristics of the woman and husband are included such as their 
relationship to the head of household, an indicator for a polygamous union, whether 
the woman has remarried, whether the woman and husband each designate the couple 
as married or living together and the interaction of the responses, and indicators for 
Muslim and Catholic for both the woman and husband.  Additionally, the couples' 
years of education are included.  Finally, factors likely to be determinants of male 
extramarital behavior are included such as the husband's age at first intercourse, 
indicators for the husband's occupation, and indicators for the husband's knowledge 
that monogamy and condoms are preventative against HIV.  Many characteristics of 
the couple and the household may be endogenous, however, due to marriage market 
matching.  For this reason, a sparse specification of equations (2) and (3) with only 
marital duration and age variables will be preferred.  The more comprehensive 
specifications will be used to demonstrate the robustness of the results. 
 
2.3  Data 
2.3.1  Sample Construction 
The sample is constructed from couples pooled from households surveyed in 






   These countries vary by income level from the lowest income 
countries of Liberia and Niger to lower middle income countries of Cameroon and 
Senegal.  In terms of religious affiliation, Guinea, Mali, Niger, and Senegal are 
predominantly Muslim countries, Liberia and Cameroon are largely Christian, and 
Benin and Burkina Faso have large shares of both Christians and Muslims.  
These particular countries in West Africa were selected because they included 
questions regarding male sexual behavior, women's decision-making authority, and 
included women's sibling mortality history.  In addition to traditional topics such as 
education, nutrition, and fertility, these surveys ask couples questions regarding 
sexual behavior and women are asked questions about their say over household 
decision-making.  Women are also asked to report the birth and death history of their 
siblings.   
The sample used in this analysis consists of couples in which at least one of 
the spouses is in their first marriage.  The DHS does not ask directly for the date of 
respondent's current marriage, but rather the date of the respondent's first marriage.  If 
either spouse or both are in their first marriage, then the couple's marital duration can 
be obtained from their responses for the date of first marriage.  The date of marriage 
is used critically to define which sibling deaths occurred post-marriage.  In total, 
15,363 couples have data for marital duration, sibling history, women's decision-
making, and men's sexual behavior. 
The sample is restricted to couples who have been in a union for at least one 
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year in order for the male sexual behavior measure in which the man is asked whether 
he has had sexual partners other than his wife (or wives) in the last year to accurately 
measure extramarital relations.  This restriction reduces the sample to 14,723 couples.  
Additionally, 60 women who identify as daughters of the head of household are 
excluded from the sample as the woman's natal household would be equivalent to the 
couple's household rendering use of the kin support measures for these households 
inappropriate.  If the woman's natal household is also the couple's household, then the 
shocks to the natal household would also be experienced by the woman's husband 
which overtly risks that the measures are correlated with the determinants of the 
man's sexual behavior decisions.  This leaves a final sample of 14,663 couples. 
 
2.3.2  Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2.1 displays general descriptive statistics of the sample.  Women are on 
average nine years younger than their husbands with slightly more than half the years 
of education.  Average marital duration is 12.2 years and 33 percent of couples are in 
a polygamous union.   
Most women in the sample do not have say over major household purchases 
with only 36 percent reporting having some say.  The measure of female bargaining 
power is constructed from the response to the question "Who usually makes decisions 
about making major purchases for the household?".  The woman is coded as having 
some say in this decision if she responds that she makes the decision or makes it 
jointly with her husband or someone else.  If the woman responds that the husband or 




the sample, 62 percent of women report their husband or partner have exclusive say, 
25 percent report sharing say with their husband or partner, 11 percent of women 
report having exclusive say, and 1 percent respond that someone else has say.  Less 
than 1 percent of women report having some say along with someone other than their 
husband or partner.  Table 2.1 displays the means for women's authority over other 
decisions -- 30 percent of women report having some say over their own healthcare, 
49 percent have say over daily household needs, and 72 percent have say over the 
food to be prepared each day. 
The dependent variable is constructed from the man's response on the DHS 
survey regarding the number of people he has had sex with in the last 12 months other 
than his wife (or wives) or live-in partner.  Such behavior is generally defined as 
high-risk sex (UNDG, 2003).  Extramarital sex in particular merits study as research 
on the spread of HIV has highlighted multiple concurrent partnerships as an important 
factor in increasing the speed of transmission, prevalence, and persistence of HIV in a 
population (Mah and Halperin, 2010).  A binary dependent variable is created from 
the man's response which indicates he has had an extramarital partner in the last 12 
months.  Table 2.1 displays that 13 percent of men in the sample have had an 
extramarital partner in the last 12 months.   
Importantly, Table 2.1 displays 95% and 96% of men and women respectively 
believe that men should only have sex with their wives, whereas 29% and 31% 
respond that men actually do only have sex with their wives.  These reported attitudes 
indicate that men are aware that extramarital sex is disapproved of and that women 




Table 2.1 also displays summary statistics for the kin support measures.  The 
mean number of living adult male siblings is 1.63.  As discussed above, fixed effects 
for the number of eligible male siblings alive at any point post-marriage are included 
in the specifications using adult male siblings as the kin support measure.  The mean 
number of eligible siblings in the sample is 1.74 siblings.  In total, 9 percent of the 
sample have fewer living adult male siblings than siblings who were eligible to 
become such due to deaths.  The mean number of deaths resulting in fewer adult male 
siblings than were eligible is 0.10.  The median age of these deaths is 28. 
The mean number of post-marriage young sibling deaths in the sample is 0.12 
with a range from 0 to 7.  In total, 9 percent of the sample has at least one post-
marriage young sibling death.  The median age at death for the young sibling deaths 
is 8 years old. 
 
2.3.3  Data Quality: Male Sexual Behavior 
The use of self-reported sexual behavior raises concerns of misreporting given 
the sensitive nature of the questions.  The respondent may over-report or underreport 
his behavior based on the social desirability of the response.  The reported levels of 
extramarital sexual behavior in the DHS are similar to those obtained in another study 
by Ferry et. al. (2001).  They survey the sexual behavior of men and women in four 
cities in sub-Saharan Africa, two of which are in Benin and Cameroon, countries 
included in this study and obtain a similar percentage of men reporting extramarital 
partners. 




correlations with sexual behavior variables less subject to misreporting. Table 2.2 
displays that the men's responses regarding extramarital behavior are correlated in the 
expected direction with the following variables: 
• Husband's HIV Status:  A blood sample was collected from male respondents 
to independently test their HIV status.  A man's extramarital partner response 
was found to be positively correlated with his HIV status with controls for the 
man's age and country, region, and village fixed-effects. While the point 
estimate is positive it is not statistically significant when using region and 
village fixed effects perhaps due to the low HIV prevalence in the sample.  1.8 
percent of men in the sample tested HIV positive.   
• Recent Sexual Activity:  Men and women are asked whether they have been 
sexually active in the last month.  Men are arguably less likely to underreport 
their recent sexual activity than extramarital sex since they are not asked to 
indicate whether their partner was extramarital.  I construct a variable 
indicating that the woman's husband has been sexually active in the last month 
and the woman has not been.  For men with one wife, this variable should be 
an indication of extramarital sex.  Column (4) of Table 2.2 displays that the 
variable is positively correlated with extramarital sex and statistically 
significant. 
• Men's Extramarital Behavior in General:  The DHS survey asks both men and 
women whether men generally in the community have sex with women other 
than their wives.  Arguably individuals face less of an incentive to misreport 




reports of men's own sexual behavior are reasonably accurate then there 
should be a positive correlation between the village-average of the response 
about the group behavior and the village-average reported sexual behavior. 
Table 2.2 illustrates that the village-average of men's sexual behavior is 
significantly positively correlated with the village average of both men and 
women's responses regarding the sexual behavior of men in general.  The 
correlations are robust to region fixed effects.  A man's individual response is 
also correlated with the village average of men's responses regarding general 
sexual behavior. The man's individual response is correlated with the village 
average of women's responses in the expected direction, but is not statistically 
significant.   
• Husband's Total Lifetime Number of Partners:  Men reporting extramarital 
partners in the last year should be expected to also report a higher number of 
lifetime partners on average.  Column (7) of Table 2.2 indicates that lifetime 
partners is positively correlated with a man reporting extramarital partners and 
statistically significant. 
• Husband Reports Having STD in the Last Year:  Men's responses regarding 
extramarital partners are positively correlated with their reports of having an 
STD in the last year and statistically significant.  As men are unlikely to over-
report having an STD, a positive correlation with extramarital sex would 
suggest that there has not been rampant over-reporting of having extramarital 
partners. 




extramarital partners are informative and measure actual behavior. 
2.4  Results 
2.4.1 The Effect of Kin Support on Female Bargaining 
Power 
 
The kin support measures for young sibling deaths and living adult male 
siblings impact women's reported say over major household purchases in the expected 
directions as shown in Table 2.3.  An increase of one post-marriage young sibling 
death results in a 2.7 percent decrease in the likelihood a woman has say in major 
household purchases.  This decline represents 7.7 percent of the sample mean for 
women's say in major household purchases and is statistically significant at the 1 
percent level.  An additional living adult male sibling results in a 2.4 percent increase 
in the likelihood the woman has some say in major household purchases.  The 
estimate is significant at the 5 percent level.  Standard errors are clustered at the 
village level and heteroskedasticity robust throughout the paper. 
The estimates are robust to the inclusion of village fixed effects and fixed 
effects for the number of eligible siblings.  Marital duration and age and age-squared 
for the woman and husband are included in all specifications.  Additionally, Table 2.3 
displays the robustness of the results to the sequential inclusion of controls for 
characteristics of the woman's natal family, household characteristics, and 
characteristics of the couple as described in Section 2.  The effect size and the 
statistical significance of the kin support measures appear robust across 




which produces similar results.
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The kin support measures also impact women's reported authority over other 
household decisions in the expected directions.  Table 2.4 displays the results of the 
regression of women's say over daily household purchases, her own healthcare, and 
food to be cooked each day on the kin support measures.  Woman's say over daily 
household purchases and say over the food to be cooked each day exhibit a 
statistically significant negative relationship with young sibling deaths.  The point 
estimates for the effect of young sibling deaths on a woman's say in her own 
healthcare is negative but not statistically significant.  Likewise, Panel B of Table 2.4 
indicates a positive relationship between living adult male siblings and these alternate 
measures of female bargaining power.  While say over healthcare and daily 
household purchases exhibit a statistically significant relationship with living adult 
male siblings, the say over food to be cooked each day is not statistically significant.  
Overall, the estimates suggest decision-making authority is affected by kin support in 
the expected directions with decision-making over major household purchases the 
most clearly affected. 
 
2.4.2  Selection on Observables 
To assess whether the kin support measures affect male sexual behavior 
through channels other than bargaining power, I check whether the kin support 
measures are balanced across observables which are fixed at the time of the couple's 
marriage.  Statistically significant variation of the measures with these observables 
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would raise concerns that the kin support measures may vary with important 
unobservables (Altonji et. al., 2005).  Table 2.5 displays a regression of several of the 
husband's characteristics regressed on the kin support measures.  The measures are 
shown to not be predictive of the husband's years of education, his age at first 
intercourse, whether he is Muslim, and the couple's age difference. These 
characteristics were chosen as they are correlated with whether the husband has 
extramarital partners and are also fixed characteristics.  The kin support measures are 
shown to be uncorrelated with these observables in both sparse and more 
comprehensive specifications.  The correlation of the measures with fixed 
characteristics of the woman is also assessed. Table 2.5 also contains the results of a 
regression of the following variables on the kin support measures: the woman's years 
of education, whether she is Muslim, and her height as a percent of the median.  No 
statistically significant relationship is found in either specification for each variable.  
The woman's height is included as it is in large part determined by her nutrition as a 
child and so may proxy for the socioeconomic status of the woman's natal family.  
The lack of correlation with these observables is reassuring for the exogeneity of the 
kin support measures. 
 
2.4.3 Reduced Form Effect of Kin Support on Male 
Sexual Behavior 
 
Based on the relevance of the kin support measures for female bargaining 
power established in the previous section and evidence that these measures can be 




bargaining power and male extramarital behavior is suggested by the reduced form. 
Reduced form estimates of the effect of post-marriage young sibling deaths and living 
adult male siblings are presented in Panels A and B of Table 2.6. The estimates 
indicate that post-marriage young sibling deaths have a positive effect on the 
likelihood a woman's husband has extramarital partners.  Each young sibling death 
results in a 1.3 percent increase in the likelihood of extramarital partners.  By the 
same magnitude, an additional living adult male sibling is estimated to decrease the 
likelihood of extramarital behavior by 1.3 percent.  These effect sizes represent 10 
percent of the sample mean for the extramarital behavior indicator in the sample.  In 
terms of the standard deviation of the kin support measures within villages, a one 
standard deviation increase in young sibling deaths or living adult male siblings 
results in a 0.4 percent increase and decrease respectively in the likelihood of 
extramarital behavior.  Such an effect represents 3 percent of the sample mean or 2 
percent of the within-village standard deviation in the likelihood of extramarital 
behavior.
16
   
A positive impact of post-marriage young sibling deaths on extramarital 
behavior, along with evidence that the young sibling deaths are negatively related to 
female bargaining power, implies a negative causal effect of female bargaining power 
on the husband's extramarital sexual behavior.  Inference utilizing young sibling 
mortality as the bargaining power shifter is robust to concerns that the measure is 
correlated with the husband's extramarital behavior merely due to a mutual 
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The instrumental variable estimates in Appendix Table A.3 reflect the conclusion from the 
reduced form that an increase in the female bargaining power measure results in a decrease in 
male extramarital behavior.  Given the concerns that the exclusion restriction is unlikely to 





correlation with sexually transmitted HIV.  As discussed above, mortality due to HIV 
is low in West Africa, and especially so for the young.  Likewise, the negative impact 
in the reduced form of living adult male siblings on the likelihood of an extramarital 
partner is also indicative of a negative causal relationship between female bargaining 
power and the husband's extramarital behavior.  The effects are modest in size, but 
suggest that a woman's bargaining power within the household does influence the 
likelihood of her husband's extramarital sexual behavior, and thus her risk of 
contracting a sexually transmitted disease. 
 
2.5  Robustness 
2.5.1  Is the Husband Affected Through Other Channels? 
The validity of the causal inference drawn from the reduced form estimates 
above rests on the kin support measures affecting the husband's extramarital behavior 
only through the woman's bargaining power.  The validity of this assumption can be 
explored further by testing whether the kin support measures are predictive of factors 
associated with other potential channels.  A concern may be that some of the deaths 
of the woman's siblings are related to HIV and thus affect the husband's knowledge of 
HIV and in turn his sexual behavior decisions.  I verify that there is no relationship 
between the kin support measures and the husband's knowledge of HIV and HIV 
prevention methods.  Specifically, I test for statistically significant relationships 
between the kin support measures and whether the husband or woman know someone 
who has died of AIDS, whether the husband has heard of AIDS, whether he believes 




Table 2.7 displays the results of these regressions and confirms that indeed the kin 
support measures are not changing any of these variables. 
An additional check which can be conducted to guard against the threat to 
validity posed by concerns that the husband is directly affected by the woman's 
sibling mortality shocks is to attempt to exclude households from the sample which 
can be identified as containing relatives of the woman.  The DHS provides 
information on the relationship to the household head for each member of the 
household.  I first restrict the sample to only couples in which either the husband or 
woman identifies as the head of household so that the relatives of the woman can be 
identified.  I then exclude households in which any parent, brother, sister, or other 
relative of the woman were residing in the household.  Households with adopted or 
foster children were also excluded as a precaution as they may be children of 
deceased siblings or siblings unable to care for their children.   Excluding couples 
who reside in these households leaves 12,642 couples in the sample.  Table 2.8 
displays results of estimates of the effect of the kin support measures on women's say 
over major household purchases and the male extramarital sexual behavior indicator.  
The results are quantitatively and qualitatively similar to those in the larger sample 
and continue to imply increased female bargaining power decreases male extramarital 
sexual behavior. 
 
2.5.2  Falsification Exercise 
Another threat to the validity of the kin support measure as a bargaining 




socioeconomic characteristics of the couple.   Such a correlation may persist and 
confound this analysis if controls do not adequately account for kin groups of low 
socioeconomic status who also experience higher mortality.  These same kin groups 
may be more likely to have low levels of female bargaining power giving rise to the 
correlations observed in the regressions above.  Given that these unobserved 
socioeconomic characteristics are likely to be associated with male sexual behavior, 
causal inference using the kin support measures would be rendered invalid due to an 
effect on the dependent variable through channels other than female bargaining 
power.  The robustness of the relationship between measures of female bargaining 
power and kin support to village fixed effects, several controls, and sibling mortality 
prior to the couple's marriage should mitigate concerns that unaccounted for 
socioeconomic characteristics of the couple continue to drive the correlation. 
However, if these unobserved socioeconomic characteristics accounted for the 
correlation between sibling mortality and female bargaining power, then the 
correlation should exist for both adult male and adult female sibling mortality.  
Siblings of both genders should be susceptible to the effects of socioeconomic status 
on mortality.  On the other hand, the kin support mechanism would predict that only 
adult male siblings would be relevant for female bargaining power given the cultural 
importance of male relatives.  Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.9, however, indicate 
that consistent with the kin support mechanism there is no statistically significant 
relationship between the number of living adult female siblings on women's say in 
major household purchases nor on the husband's extramarital behavior, unlike for 




Furthermore, if the young sibling mortality measure is to have the 
interpretation of a negative shock to the woman's natal family, then we should 
observe that the deaths of siblings of both genders have an impact on the bargaining 
power measure and male extramarital behavior.  The results in Panels B and C in 
Table 2.9 demonstrate that indeed a relationship exists between women's say and the 
number of young sibling deaths of both genders.  Both genders of young sibling 
deaths have the expected positive effect on the likelihood the man has an extramarital 
partner. The young female sibling variable just loses statistical significance in the 
more comprehensive specification and the number of young male sibling deaths is 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level in the more comprehensive 
specification, but just loses statistical significance in the sparse specification. 
 
2.5.3  Recent Sibling Deaths 
The specifications in this study thus far include marital duration as a control 
variable.  Controlling for marital duration was necessary due to the construction of 
the kin support measures.  Even conditional on age, women in couples who have been 
married longer are more likely by construction to have post-marriage young sibling 
deaths and also more deaths of siblings eligible to have become living adult male 
siblings.  Given that marital duration may also be correlated with the likelihood the 
man has taken extramarital partners, controlling for marital duration was required to 
ensure the exogeneity of the kin support measures.  For example, if extramarital sex is 
a cause of divorce, then men in couples who have been married longer are less likely 




couples for whom divorce is feasible and may be jointly determined with male sexual 
behavior.  Therefore, there is a risk that marital duration is endogenous and its 
inclusion in regressions may bias all coefficients in the regression. 
I define a kin support measure to include only recent sibling deaths rather than 
post-marriage deaths in order to avoid the need to control for marital duration.  Given 
the apparent importance of adult male siblings and young sibling mortality in the 
specifications above, I construct a measure for young sibling and adult male sibling 
deaths occurring in the last year or in the last five years.  In Panels A and B in Table 
2.10, I present estimates of the effect of the new measures on women's say in major 
household purchases as well as reduced form effects on male extramarital behavior.  
The new estimates are conducted for specifications including few controls and many 
controls.  None of the specifications include marital duration as a control.  Also, to 
ensure that the sibling deaths did not occur pre-marriage, I exclude couples with 
marital durations of less than five years from the sample in the specification using the 
sibling deaths in the last five years as the measure.  The estimates displayed in Panels 
A and B in Table 2.10 are of the expected signs, but exhibit large standard errors 
likely due to the reduced variation caused by limiting the period over which the 
sibling deaths occurred.  In order to increase precision, I combine the young and adult 
male sibling deaths for each time period and re-estimate their effect on female 
bargaining power and extramarital behavior in Panel C.  The effects for this combined 
measure are statistically significant for the female bargaining power measure and just 
lose statistical significance in the reduced form effects on extramarital behavior in the 




consistent with results from the main specifications suggesting that bias due to the 
inclusion of marital duration did not drive the results. 
 
2.6  Conclusion 
Overall, the results in this study suggest that a woman's bargaining power 
within the household and control over resources does influence the likelihood her 
husband has extramarital partners. Shocks to a determinant of women's bargaining 
power, kin support, are used to identify the causal effect. First, post-marriage deaths 
of a woman's male siblings induce variation in her current number of living adult 
male siblings. An additional living adult male sibling is shown to increase a woman's 
authority over key household decisions and to decrease her husband's extramarital 
relations. Consistent with a kin support mechanism and the cultural importance of 
male relatives, living adult female siblings are shown to have no relationship over a 
woman's decision-making authority and her husband's extramarital behavior. 
Similarly, the post-marriage deaths of women's young siblings, capturing 
shocks to the woman's natal family, were found to negatively impact a woman's 
decision-making authority and to increase the likelihood of extramarital behavior. 
The kin support measures are balanced across observables and results are robust to 
changes in specification. 
These results lend credence to efforts by development practitioners to reduce 
women's vulnerability to HIV by addressing gender inequality. In particular, efforts to 
reduce women's economic dependence on their partners may be most effective. In 




HIV vulnerability of lessening their dependent position within pre-marital cross-
generational relationships, known to be an important source of HIV transmission in 
sub-Saharan Africa. Finally, regarding women's own sexual behavior, it will be 
important to assess whether reductions in HIV transmission due to improvements in 
gender equality are at all mitigated by increases in women's own high-risk behavior 































Mean Std. Dev. N
Key Variables
Husband Has Extramarital Partner (0/1) 0.13 0.33 14,663
Woman Has Say in Large Household Purchases (0/1) 0.36 0.48 14,613
Other Bargaining Power Measures
Woman Has Say in Own Healthcare (0/1) 0.30 0.46 12,651
Woman Has Say in Daily Household Purchases (0/1) 0.48 0.50 14,605
Woman Has Say in Food to be Cooked Each Day (0/1) 0.71 0.45 12,518
Couple Characteristics
Woman's Age 30.1 8.06 14,663
Husband's Age 39.4 9.41 14,663
Woman's Years of Education 1.73 3.81 14,652
Husband's Years of Education 3.32 5.27 14,644
Polygamous Union (0/1) 0.33 0.47 14,663
Marital Duration 12.3 8.08 14,663
Muslim Husband (0/1) 0.58 0.49 14,638
Christian Husband (0/1) 0.31 0.46 14,638
Sexual Behavior Attitudes and Knowledge
Woman:  Men should only have sex with their wives (0/1) 0.95 0.22 6,193
Husband:  Men should only have sex with their wives (0/1) 0.96 0.20 6,210
Woman:  Men do only have sex with wives (0/1) 0.31 0.46 6,458
Husband:  Men do only have sex with wives (0/1) 0.29 0.46 6,458
Woman:  Sex with one partner who has no other partners reduces 
chance of AIDS (0/1)
0.70 0.46 14,643
Husband:  Sex with one partner who has no other partners reduces 
chance of AIDS (0/1)
0.85 0.36 14,645
Sibling Mortality Instruments
Number of Post-Marriage Young Sibling Deaths 0.12 0.43 14,663
Number of Eligible Post-Marriage Young Siblings 3.01 2.36 14,663
Median Age of Post-Marriage Young Sibling Deaths 7.99 6.30 1,224
Number of Living Adult Male Siblings 1.63 1.41 14,663
Number of Eligible Living Adult Male Siblings 1.74 1.48 14,663
Median Age of Adult Male Sibling Deaths in Eligible Group 28.0 14.40 1,295
Number of Siblings Ever Born 5.65 2.53 14,129
Table 2.1:  Summary Statistics
Notes: This table consists of summary statistics for the sample of couples pooled from the Demographic and




Sex in Last 
Month          
&             
Woman:  
No Sex in 
Last Month  
(0/1)
Husband's 












(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4) (5) (6) (7)
    0.010** 0.007 0.006 0.011      0.115***     0.131***      -0.684***   0.040*** 3.59***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.016)      (0.016)          (0.014)          (0.114)       (0.008)     (0.409)     
0.084* 0.268***
(0.045)  (0.046)      
Fixed Effects Country Region Village Village Region Village Region Village Village Village Village
Mean of Dep. 
Variable
0.017 0.017 0.017 0.426 0.474 0.514 0.556 0.108 20.2 0.028 5.65
N 11,137 11,137 11,137 6,463 1,434 6,349 1,434 9,727 14,515 14,599 7,689
Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. All regressions except 2b and 3b include controls for husband and woman's age and age-squared. Sample in column (4)
includes only husband's with one wife.     * significant at 10%;  ** significant at 5%;  *** significant at 1%
Table 2.2: Husband Sexual Behavior Correlations
Village Average:  Women 
Say Most Men have Sex 
with Women Other 
Than Wives
Village Average:  Men 
Say Most Men have Sex 









Husband HIV Positive (0/1)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
    -0.027***     -0.028***    -0.025***     -0.026***     -0.027***     -0.038***     -0.042**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.017)
   0.024**    0.028***    0.028***    0.030***    0.027**    0.036**    0.045**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.015) (0.018)
Woman's Natal Family Characteristics:  
Eligible Sibling Determinants
Woman's Natal Family Characteristics:  
Child Mortality Determinants
Household Characteristics
Table 2.3: The Effect of the Kin Support Measures on Female Bargaining Power
OLS FE Logit
Additional Covariates For All Panels
Number of Young Sibling Deaths
Number of Living Adult Male Siblings
Woman Has Say in Major Household Purchases (0/1)
Panel A:  Post-Marriage Young Sibling Deaths
Panel B:  Living Adult Male Siblings
N 14,613 14,012 13,641 13,557 13,097 8,677 7,546
Couple Characteristics
Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. All regressions include village fixed-effects, fixed-effects for the number of eligible siblings, and controls for marital
duration, age and age-squared of the woman and her husband.  ** significant at 5%;  *** significant at 1%
Notes: Eligible siblings in the regressions in Panel A are siblings under age 20 at the time of the woman's marriage, or born subsequently. Eligible siblings in Panel B consist of the
adult male siblings alive at the woman's marriage, or younger male siblings who could have come of age afterwards.Women's Natal Family Characteristics : (1) Eligible Sibling Determinants:
fraction of siblings born before woman, average birth spacing of woman's siblings, interaction of fraction born before and average birth spacing. (2) Child Mortality Determinants:
number of sibling births in which the birth spacing was less than 24 months, proportion of siblings that are male, woman's height as percent of median, proportion of siblings born
before woman's marriage who died before age 5, number of pre-marriage young sibling deaths, number of siblings born before woman's marriage. Household Characteristics : fixed effects
for wealth index, and one indicator each for electricity, TV, and radio possession. Couple Characteristics : years of education each for woman and husband, Muslim and Christian indicator
each for husband and woman, indicators for husband's occupation categories, husband's age at first intercourse, indicator for woman has been in multiple unions, indicators each for
husband and woman for whether they identify the relationship as married or just living together, indicator for couple is in a polygamous union, indicators for husband's knowledge of
HIV prevention through condom use and monogamy, indicators for relationship to head of household each for husband and woman. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
-0.009  -0.009    -0.019**   -0.017*     -0.028***  -0.020*
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
0.019* 0.021* 0.015   0.019* 0.014 0.009
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
N 12,651 11,423 14,605 13,092 12,518 11,309
Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. All regressions include village fixed-effects, fixed-effects for the number of eligible siblings, and controls for marital
duration, age and age-squared of the woman and her husband.  * significant at 10%;  ** significant at 5%;  *** significant at 1%
Woman Has Say Over Her Own 
Healthcare (0/1)
Woman Has Say in Daily 
Household Purchases (0/1)
Woman Has Say Over Food to 
be Cooked Each Day (0/1)
Additional Covariates For All Panels
Woman's Natal Family, 
Household, and Couple 
Characteristics
Table 2.4: The Effect of the Kin Support Measures on Other Measures of Female Bargaining Power
Panel A:  Post-Marriage Young Sibling Deaths
Number of Young Sibling Deaths
Panel B:  Living Adult Male Siblings
Number of Living Adult Male 
Siblings
Notes: Eligible siblings in the regressions in Panel A are siblings under age 20 at the time of the woman's marriage, or born subsequently. Eligible siblings in Panel B consist of the
adult male siblings alive at the woman's marriage, or younger male siblings who could have come of age afterwards. Women's Natal Family Characteristics : (1) Eligible Sibling
Determinants: fraction of siblings born before woman, average birth spacing of woman's siblings, interaction of fraction born before and average birth spacing. (2) Child Mortality
Determinants: number of sibling births in which the birth spacing was less than 24 months, proportion of siblings that are male, woman's height as percent of median, proportion of
siblings born before woman's marriage who died before age 5, number of pre-marriage young sibling deaths, number of siblings born before woman's marriage. Household Characteristics :  
fixed effects for wealth index, and one indicator each for electricity, TV, and radio possession. Couple Characteristics : years of education each for woman and husband, Muslim and
Christian indicator each for husband and woman, indicators for husband's occupation categories, husband's age at first intercourse, indicator for woman has been in multiple unions,
indicators each for husband and woman for whether they identify the relationship as married or just living together, indicator for couple is in a polygamous union, indicators for
husband's knowledge of HIV prevention through condom use and monogamy, indicators for relationship to head of household each for husband and woman. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
0.025 0.061 -0.041 -0.041 0.143 0.189 -0.004 0.007 0.025 0.061 0.003 0.005 -0.077 -0.041
(0.043) (0.047) (0.086) (0.091) (0.131) (0.132) (0.005) (0.005) (0.043) (0.047) (0.006) (0.006) (0.084) (0.088)
-0.092 -0.042 -0.128 -0.131 0.024 0.082 -0.002 -0.005 -0.092 -0.042 -0.001 -0.003 -0.094 -0.098
(0.060) (0.057) (0.096) (0.099) (0.154) (0.155) (0.006) (0.006) (0.060) (0.057) (0.006) (0.006) (0.098) (0.101)
Mean of Dependent Variable 1.68 1.65 20.2 20.2 9.26 9.26 0.580 0.581 1.68 1.65 0.568 0.571 97.7 97.8
Woman is Muslim 
(0/1)
Woman's Height 
as Percent of 
Median
Table 2.5: Selection on Observables
Woman's Natal Family, 
Household, and Couple 
Characteristics











Number of Young Sibling 
Deaths
Panel A:  Post-Marriage Young Sibling Deaths
Panel B:  Living Adult Male Siblings
Additional Covariates for All Panels
Woman's Years of 
Education
N 14,597 13,121 14,465 13,097 14,613 13,097 14,588 13,244 14,597 13,121 14,595 13,252 14,238 13,097
Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. All regressions include village fixed-effects, fixed-effects for the number of eligible siblings, and controls for marital
duration, age and age-squared of the woman and her husband.  
Notes: Eligible siblings in the regressions in Panel A are siblings under age 20 at the time of the woman's marriage, or born subsequently. Eligible siblings in Panel B consist of the
adult male siblings alive at the woman's marriage, or younger male siblings who could have come of age afterwards. Women's Natal Family Characteristics : (1) Eligible Sibling
Determinants: fraction of siblings born before woman, average birth spacing of woman's siblings, interaction of fraction born before and average birth spacing. (2) Child Mortality
Determinants: number of sibling births in which the birth spacing was less than 24 months, proportion of siblings that are male, woman's height as percent of median, proportion of
siblings born before woman's marriage who died before age 5, number of pre-marriage young sibling deaths, number of siblings born before woman's marriage. Household Characteristics :  
fixed effects for wealth index, and one indicator each for electricity, TV, and radio possession. Couple Characteristics : years of education each for woman and husband, Muslim and
Christian indicator each for husband and woman, indicators for husband's occupation categories, husband's age at first intercourse, indicator for woman has been in multiple unions,
indicators each for husband and woman for whether they identify the relationship as married or just living together, indicator for couple is in a polygamous union, indicators for
husband's knowledge of HIV prevention through condom use and monogamy, indicators for relationship to head of household each for husband and woman. Selected Covariates
Removed : years of education removed from independent variables in Column (1), (2), (9), and (10); husband's age at first intercourse removed from Column (3) and (4); age variables
removed in Columns (5) and (6);  religion variables removed in Columns (7), (8), (11), (12); woman's height as percent of median removed in Columns (13) and (14).
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
   0.013**    0.012** 0.013* 0.012*  0.014**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
-0.013* -0.013* -0.014* -0.014* -0.013
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Couple Characteristics
Additional Covariates For All Panels
Woman's Natal Family Characteristics:  Eligible 
Sibling Determinants
Woman's Natal Family Characteristics:  Child 
Mortality Determinants
Household Characteristics
Number of Living Adult Male Siblings
Table 2.6: Reduced Form Effect of Kin Support Measures on Male Extramarital Sexual Behavior
Husband Has Extramarital Partner (0/1)
Panel A:  Post-Marriage Young Sibling Deaths
Number of Young Sibling Deaths
Panel B:  Living Adult Male Siblings
N 14,663 14,056 13,684 13,599 13,138
Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. All regressions include village fixed-effects, fixed-effects for the number of eligible siblings, and controls for marital
duration, age and age-squared of the woman and her husband.  * significant at 10%;  ** significant at 5%
Notes: Eligible siblings in the regressions in Panel A are siblings under age 20 at the time of the woman's marriage, or born subsequently. Eligible siblings in Panel B consist of the
adult male siblings alive at the woman's marriage, or younger male siblings who could have come of age afterwards. Women's Natal Family Characteristics : (1) Eligible Sibling
Determinants: fraction of siblings born before woman, average birth spacing of woman's siblings, interaction of fraction born before and average birth spacing. (2) Child Mortality
Determinants: number of sibling births in which the birth spacing was less than 24 months, proportion of siblings that are male, woman's height as percent of median, proportion of
siblings born before woman's marriage who died before age 5, number of pre-marriage young sibling deaths, number of siblings born before woman's marriage. Household Characteristics :  
fixed effects for wealth index, and one indicator each for electricity, TV, and radio possession. Couple Characteristics : years of education each for woman and husband, Muslim and
Christian indicator each for husband and woman, indicators for husband's occupation categories, husband's age at first intercourse, indicator for woman has been in multiple unions,
indicators each for husband and woman for whether they identify the relationship as married or just living together, indicator for couple is in a polygamous union, indicators for
husband's knowledge of HIV prevention through condom use and monogamy, indicators for relationship to head of household each for husband and woman.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
-0.005 0.004 0.006 0.015 0.000 0.001 -0.008 -0.010 -0.009 -0.009
(0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.015) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008)
-0.012 -0.019 -0.007 0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 0.001 -0.001 0.001
(0.012) (0.013) (0.016) (0.017) (0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009)
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.285 0.290 0.267 0.271 0.973 0.974 0.717 0.720 0.849 0.853
Panel A:  Post-Marriage Young Sibling Deaths
Number of Young Sibling Deaths
Panel B:  Living Adult Male Siblings
Number of Living Adult Male 
Siblings
Additional Covariates For All Panels
Woman's Natal Family, 
Household, and Couple 
Characteristics
Table 2.7: The Effect of Kin Support Measures on Husband's HIV Knowledge
Husband Knows 
Someone Who 




Died of AIDS 
(0/1)
Husband Has 








Reduces Chance of 
AIDS (0/1)
N 9,244 8,399 7,700 7,014 14,661 13,179 14,628 13,148 14,645 13,163
Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. All regressions include village fixed-effects, fixed-effects for the number of eligible siblings, and controls for marital
duration, age and age-squared of the woman and her husband.  
Notes: Eligible siblings in the regressions in Panel A are siblings under age 20 at the time of the woman's marriage, or born subsequently. Eligible siblings in Panel B consist of the
adult male siblings alive at the woman's marriage, or younger male siblings who could have come of age afterwards. Women's Natal Family Characteristics : (1) Eligible Sibling
Determinants: fraction of siblings born before woman, average birth spacing of woman's siblings, interaction of fraction born before and average birth spacing. (2) Child Mortality
Determinants: number of sibling births in which the birth spacing was less than 24 months, proportion of siblings that are male, woman's height as percent of median, proportion of
siblings born before woman's marriage who died before age 5, number of pre-marriage young sibling deaths, number of siblings born before woman's marriage. Household Characteristics :  
fixed effects for wealth index, and one indicator each for electricity, TV, and radio possession. Couple Characteristics : years of education each for woman and husband, Muslim and
Christian indicator each for husband and woman, indicators for husband's occupation categories, husband's age at first intercourse, indicator for woman has been in multiple unions,
indicators each for husband and woman for whether they identify the relationship as married or just living together, indicator for couple is in a polygamous union, indicators for
relationship to head of household each for husband and woman.   
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
  -0.023***   -0.026***   0.012*   0.014*
(0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007)
  0.028**    0.031*** -0.016* -0.017*
(0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009)
N 12,481 11,214 12,481 11,214
Panel B:  Living Adult Male Siblings
Number of Living Adult Male Siblings
Additional Covariates For All Panels
Woman's Natal Family, Household, and 
Couple Characteristics
Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. All regressions include village fixed-effects, fixed-effects for the number of eligible siblings, and controls for marital
duration, age and age-squared of the woman and her husband.  * significant at 10%;  ** significant at 5%;  *** significant at 1%
Table 2.8: Excluding Households with Women's Relatives
Woman Has Say in Major Household 
Purchases (0/1)
Husband Has Extramarital Partner (0/1)
Panel A:  Post-Marriage Young Sibling Deaths
Number of Young Sibling Deaths
Notes: Eligible siblings in the regressions in Panel A are siblings under age 20 at the time of the woman's marriage, or born subsequently. Eligible siblings in Panel B consist of the
adult male siblings alive at the woman's marriage, or younger male siblings who could have come of age afterwards. Women's Natal Family Characteristics : (1) Eligible Sibling
Determinants: fraction of siblings born before woman, average birth spacing of woman's siblings, interaction of fraction born before and average birth spacing. (2) Child Mortality
Determinants: number of sibling births in which the birth spacing was less than 24 months, proportion of siblings that are male, woman's height as percent of median, proportion of
siblings born before woman's marriage who died before age 5, number of pre-marriage young sibling deaths, number of siblings born before woman's marriage. Household Characteristics :  
fixed effects for wealth index, and one indicator each for electricity, TV, and radio possession. Couple Characteristics : years of education each for woman and husband, Muslim and
Christian indicator each for husband and woman, indicators for husband's occupation categories, husband's age at first intercourse, indicator for woman has been in multiple unions,
indicators each for husband and woman for whether they identify the relationship as married or just living together, indicator for couple is in a polygamous union, indicators for
husband's knowledge of HIV prevention through condom use and monogamy, indicators for relationship to head of household each for husband and woman. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
0.009 0.009 -0.003 0.002
(0.012) (0.013)   (0.009) (0.009)
-0.028** -0.028* 0.017* 0.015
(0.013) (0.014) (0.010) (0.011)
-0.028** -0.026* 0.014 0.019*
(0.013) (0.015) (0.009) (0.010)
N 14,613 13,097 14,663 13,138
Woman's Natal Family, Household, and 
Couple Characteristics
Panel B:  Post-Marriage Young Female Sibling Deaths
Number of Young Female Sibling Deaths
Panel C:  Post-Marriage Young Male Sibling Deaths
Number of Young Male Sibling Deaths
Additional Covariates For All Panels
Table 2.9: Falsification Exercise
Woman Has Say in Major Household 
Purchases (0/1)
Husband Has Extramarital Partner (0/1)
Panel A:  Living Adult Female Siblings
Number of Living Adult Female Siblings
Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. All regressions include village fixed-effects, fixed-effects for the number of eligible siblings, and controls for marital
duration, age and age-squared of the woman and her husband.  * significant at 10%;  ** significant at 5%
Notes: Eligible siblings in the regressions in Panel A consist of the adult female siblings alive at the woman's marriage, or younger female siblings who could have come of age
afterwards. Eligible siblings in Panels B and C are siblings of each respective gender under age 20 at the time of the woman's marriage, or born subsequently. Women's Natal Family
Characteristics : (1) Eligible Sibling Determinants: fraction of siblings born before woman, average birth spacing of woman's siblings, interaction of fraction born before and average birth
spacing. (2) Child Mortality Determinants: number of sibling births in which the birth spacing was less than 24 months, proportion of siblings that are male, woman's height as percent
of median, proportion of siblings born before woman's marriage who died before age 5, number of pre-marriage young sibling deaths, number of siblings born before woman's
marriage. Household Characteristics : fixed effects for wealth index, and one indicator each for electricity, TV, and radio possession. Couple Characteristics : years of education each for
woman and husband, Muslim and Christian indicator each for husband and woman, indicators for husband's occupation categories, husband's age at first intercourse, indicator for
woman has been in multiple unions, indicators each for husband and woman for whether they identify the relationship as married or just living together, indicator for couple is in a
polygamous union, indicators for husband's knowledge of HIV prevention through condom use and monogamy, indicators for relationship to head of household each for husband and
woman.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
-0.054 -0.060   -0.039** -0.035* 0.018 0.020 0.019 0.022
(0.037) (0.038) (0.017) (0.018) (0.034) (0.036) (0.017) (0.018)
-0.043 -0.065    -0.040**    -0.047**   0.064* 0.057 0.022 0.016
(0.038) (0.040) (0.018) (0.019) (0.034) (0.037) (0.015) (0.016)
   -0.046*    -0.060**     -0.042***     -0.043*** 0.040 0.038 0.017 0.015
   (0.027) (0.028) (-0.012)  (-0.013)  (0.025) (0.026) (0.011) (0.012)
Table 2.10: Recent Sibling Deaths as Kin Support Measures
Woman Has Say in Major Household Purchases 
(0/1)
Husband Has Extramarital Partner (0/1)
Panel A:  Young Sibling Deaths
Number of Young Sibling 
Deaths
Deaths in Last Year Deaths in Last 5 Years Deaths in Last Year Deaths in Last 5 Years
Panel C:  Young Sibling or Adult Male Sibling Deaths
Number of Young Sibling or 
Adult Male Sibling Deaths
Panel B:  Adult Male Sibling Deaths
Number of Adult Male Sibling 
Deaths
Woman's Natal Family, 
Household, and Couple 
Additional Covariates For All Panels
N 14,613 13,107 11,783 10,571 14,663 13,148 11,822 10,606
Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. All regressions include village fixed-effects, fixed-effects for the number of eligible siblings, and controls for marital
duration, age and age-squared of the woman and her husband.  * significant at 10%;  ** significant at 5%;  *** significant at 1%
Notes: Women's Natal Family Characteristics : (1) Eligible Sibling Determinants: fraction of siblings born before woman, average birth spacing of woman's siblings, interaction of fraction
born before and average birth spacing. (2) Child Mortality Determinants: number of sibling births in which the birth spacing was less than 24 months, proportion of siblings that are
male, woman's height as percent of median, proportion of siblings born before woman's marriage who died before age 5, number of pre-marriage young sibling deaths, number of
siblings born before woman's marriage. Household Characteristics : fixed effects for wealth index, and one indicator each for electricity, TV, and radio possession. Couple Characteristics :  
years of education each for woman and husband, Muslim and Christian indicator each for husband and woman, indicators for husband's occupation categories, husband's age at first
intercourse, indicator for woman has been in multiple unions, indicators each for husband and woman for whether they identify the relationship as married or just living together,
indicator for couple is in a polygamous union, indicators for husband's knowledge of HIV prevention through condom use and monogamy, indicators for relationship to head of
household each for husband and woman.
Characteristics
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
-0.013 -0.011 -0.012 -0.011 -0.011
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
N 14,613 14,012 13, 641 13,557 13,097
Woman Has Say in Major Household 
Purchases (0/1)
Woman's Natal Family Characteristics:  
Child Mortality Determinants
Husband Has Extramarital Partner (0/1)
Table A.1:  OLS Estimates of the Effect of Female Bargaining Power on Male Extramarital Behavior




Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. Column(1) is a regression with village fixed effects and age and age-squared of the couple as the only controls.
Columns (1) - (5) include village fixed-effects, fixed-effects for the number of eligible siblings, and controls for marital duration, age and age-squared of the woman and her
husband.   ** significant at 5%;  *** significant at 1%
Notes: Eligible siblings for post-marriage young sibling deaths are siblings under age 20 at the time of the woman's marriage, or born subsequently. Siblings eligible to be
living adult male siblings consist of the adult male siblings alive at the woman's marriage, or younger male siblings who could have come of age afterwards.
Women's Natal Family Characteristics : (1) Eligible Sibling Determinants: fraction of siblings born before woman, average birth spacing of woman's siblings, interaction of
fraction born before and average birth spacing. (2) Child Mortality Determinants: number of sibling births in which the birth spacing was less than 24 months, proportion
of siblings that are male, woman's height as percent of median, proportion of siblings born before woman's marriage who died before age 5, number of pre-marriage young
sibling deaths, number of siblings born before woman's marriage. Household Characteristics : fixed effects for wealth index, and one indicator each for electricity, TV, and radio
possession. Couple Characteristics : years of education each for woman and husband, Muslim and Christian indicator each for husband and woman, indicators for husband's
occupation categories, husband's age at first intercourse, indicator for woman has been in multiple unions, indicators each for husband and woman for whether they identify
the relationship as married or just living together, indicator for couple is in a polygamous union, indicators for husband's knowledge of HIV prevention through condom use
and monogamy, indicators for relationship to head of household each for husband and woman.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
    -0.027***     -0.027***    -0.022**    -0.021**
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
   0.025**    0.027**   0.018*   0.021*
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Partial F-Statistic 10.27 8.54 5.84 6.36 6.53 5.73
N 14,613 13,097 14,613 13,097 14,613 13,097
Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. All regressions include village fixed-effects, fixed-effects for the number of eligible siblings, and controls for marital
duration, age and age-squared of the woman and her husband.   ** significant at 5%;  *** significant at 1%
Notes: Eligible siblings for post-marriage young sibling deaths are siblings under age 20 at the time of the woman's marriage, or born subsequently. Siblings eligible to be living adult
male siblings consist of the adult male siblings alive at the woman's marriage, or younger male siblings who could have come of age afterwards. Women's Natal Family Characteristics : (1)
Eligible Sibling Determinants: fraction of siblings born before woman, average birth spacing of woman's siblings, interaction of fraction born before and average birth spacing. (2)
Child Mortality Determinants: number of sibling births in which the birth spacing was less than 24 months, proportion of siblings that are male, woman's height as percent of median,
Table A.2:  First-Stage Estimates of the Effect of the Kin Support Measures on Female Bargaining Power
Woman Has Say in Major Household Purchases (0/1)
Number of Post-Marriage Young Sibling 
Deaths
Number of Living Adult Male Siblings
Woman's Natal Family, Household, and 
Couple Characteristics
proportion of siblings born before woman's marriage who died before age 5, number of pre-marriage young sibling deaths, number of siblings born before woman's marriage. Household 
Characteristics : fixed effects for wealth index, and one indicator each for electricity, TV, and radio possession. Couple Characteristics : years of education each for woman and husband,
Muslim and Christian indicator each for husband and woman, indicators for husband's occupation categories, husband's age at first intercourse, indicator for woman has been in
multiple unions, indicators each for husband and woman for whether they identify the relationship as married or just living together, indicator for couple is in a polygamous union,







   -0.475**   -0.480*
(0.240) (0.256)
Hansen J-Statistic (p-value) 0.83 0.94
Table A.3: 2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Female Bargaining Power on Male Extramarital Behavior
Panel A:  IV with Post-Marriage Young Sibling Deaths
Woman Has Say in Major Household Purchases (0/1)
Additional Covariates for All Panels
Woman's Natal Family, Household, and Couple 
Characteristics
Husband Has Extramarital Partner (0/1)
Panel B:  IV with Living Adult Male Siblings
Woman Has Say in Major Household Purchases (0/1)
Panel C:  Overidentified IV
Woman Has Say in Major Household Purchases (0/1)
N 14,613 13,097
Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. All regressions include village fixed-effects, fixed-effects for the number of eligible siblings, and controls for marital
duration, age and age-squared of the woman and her husband.  * significant at 10%;  ** significant at 5%
Notes: Eligible siblings in the regressions in Panel A are siblings under age 20 at the time of the woman's marriage, or born subsequently. Eligible siblings in Panel B consist of
the adult male siblings alive at the woman's marriage, or younger male siblings who could have come of age afterwards. Panel C uses both kin support measures as instruments
and fixed-effects for eligible siblings for both measures. Women's Natal Family Characteristics : (1) Eligible Sibling Determinants: fraction of siblings born before woman, average
birth spacing of woman's siblings, interaction of fraction born before and average birth spacing. (2) Child Mortality Determinants: number of sibling births in which the birth
spacing was less than 24 months, proportion of siblings that are male, woman's height as percent of median, proportion of siblings born before woman's marriage who died
before age 5, number of pre-marriage young sibling deaths, number of siblings born before woman's marriage. Household Characteristics : fixed effects for wealth index, and one
indicator each for electricity, TV, and radio possession. Couple Characteristics : years of education each for woman and husband, Muslim and Christian indicator each for husband
and woman, indicators for husband's occupation categories, husband's age at first intercourse, indicator for woman has been in multiple unions, indicators each for husband and
woman for whether they identify the relationship as married or just living together, indicator for couple is in a polygamous union, indicators for husband's knowledge of HIV






Kin Support, Female Bargaining Power, and Fertility 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Maternal mortality rates in West Africa are among the highest in the world 
(WHO et al., 2007). Estimates range as high as 1 in 7 women in Niger expected to die 
from a maternal cause during their lifetime. For every woman that dies, 20 more are 
estimated to suffer injuries, infection, and disability (WHO et al., 2010). In 
recognition of these facts, improving maternal health was adopted as one of eight of 
the Millennium Development Goals, with a key target being the reduction of the rate 
of maternal mortality by three-quarters from 1990 to 2015 (WHO et al., 2010). A key 
factor in achieving this goal will be reducing the high rates of fertility which persist in 
many developing countries, particularly those with high maternal mortality 
(Diamond-Smith and Potts, 2011). In West Africa, the average number of live births 
for a woman is more than five in the countries with the highest rates of maternal 
mortality, with nearly seven live births per woman in Niger (UN, 2012). 
Evidence suggests a significant portion of fertility in West Africa is unwanted 
by women with an estimate of nearly nine percent of births unwanted (Westoff, 
2001). Additionally, more than a quarter of women in the region report wanting to 
discontinue bearing children or to increase their birth spacing, yet are not using 
contraceptive methods (Westoff, 2001).  Development practitioners and researchers 
have focused on the possible role of intrahousehold bargaining and disagreement 




explaining high fertility and fertility beyond women's desired level (Ashraf et al., 
2010; Klawon and Tiefenthaler, 2001; Varanasi, 2009; Field, 2003; Rasul, 2007; 
Schultz, 1990; Thomas, 1990; Seebens, 2005).
17
 Men in the developing country 
context prefer larger family sizes on average than women (Bankole and Singh, 1998). 
Figures 3.1a and 3.1b depict this phenomenon for households drawn from surveys in 
eight West African countries. Men may prefer a greater number of children than 
women because the burden and risks of pregnancy, and the costs of child rearing fall 
mostly to women. Additionally, men may be the primary beneficiaries of the labor of 
more children (Caldwell, 1982; Seebens, 2005). Therefore, a bargaining theory of 
fertility would suggest that a reduction in a woman's bargaining power relative to her 
husband will result in her deferral to her husband's generally higher fertility 
preferences. As a result, improving women's status in the household may be an 
important route in reducing fertility and improving women's health, in addition to 
being a worthwhile policy objective per se. 
Several previous empirical studies have generally claimed evidence in support 
of the theory, finding a negative effect of women's bargaining power on fertility. 
Klawon and Tiefenthaler (2001) and Thomas (1990) find that greater non-wage 
income in women's control led to fewer births for Brazilian households. Along the 
same lines, Seebens (2005) find that a woman who brings more assets to the marriage 
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 Women surveyed in Benin did not report access to and knowledge of family planning 
methods as a predominant limitation in taking advantage of contraception (USAID, 2005).   
Given the retrospective fertility history studied in this paper, the access to family planning 
methods for couples throughout the years covered by the sample is also relevant.   Modern 
planning family methods were largely unavailable until 1960 in West Africa, after which 
official government policies improving access emerged.  The first year of marriage of couples 
studied in this paper occurred in 1966, with over 90 percent of couple-marriage years studied 
are after 1985.  Therefore, access to family planning methods alone is unlikely to explain 




has fewer children and longer birth spacing in a survey of Ethiopian households. 
Contrary to these findings, Schultz (1990) finds that greater non-wage income leads 
to an increase in fertility in a Thai survey. Field (2003) uses variation in an urban land 
titling program in Peru which included women's names on land title registration for 
the first time, increasing the security of her property rights. Given that the effect of 
land titling may affect fertility through channels other than more secure property 
rights for women, Field tests for an effect of bargaining power on fertility using 
measures of a woman's decision-making authority and the couple's age difference as 
an instrument. Field finds that the instrumental variable estimation provides evidence 
that women's bargaining power at least partially causes the decline in fertility 
observed after titling. Varanasi (2009) also employs an instrumental variable strategy 
in a study of Indonesia, instrumenting for a measure of a woman's household 
decision-making authority with community level variables such as relative male-
female wages and relative education, as well as the types of credit institutions 
available. 
While the findings of these studies are overall suggestive of a causal 
relationship between bargaining power and fertility, the inferences remain vulnerable 
to omitted variable bias. In the case of the studies using non-labor income as a proxy 
for bargaining power, the risk is that non-labor income may be endogenous (Varanasi, 
2009). Men and women may pair into marriages on the basis of their assets at the 
time of marriage. A similar concern arises for the use of identifying variation from 
differences in the spouses' ages and other factors likely affecting household 




bargaining power across women, while not an outcome of the couple's actions, may 
nevertheless be correlated with unobserved factors, such as norms, varying at the 
community level which are also correlated with fertility and women's status. For 
example, a high ratio of male to female education may be the result of attitudes 
regarding the appropriate role of women in society and the household. Such 
unobserved factors are very likely also correlated with intrahousehold bargaining 
power and fertility, biasing estimates of the causal effect of bargaining power on 
fertility. 
This study attempts to overcome these identification issues and contribute to 
the empirical literature on the causal effect of bargaining power on fertility by 
utilizing a source of variation in women's bargaining power which varies within 
couples over time -- shocks to a woman's kin support during her marriage. The use of 
a bargaining power shifter which varies within a couple over time allows for the 
inclusion of couple fixed effects, controlling for observed and unobserved time 
invariant differences across couples. Shocks to a woman's kin support during her 
marriage are captured by the deaths of women's young siblings over time. The deaths 
of young siblings serve as an indication that the woman's natal family has suffered an 
adverse shock. The woman's natal family serves as a fall-back source of support for 
the woman should her marriage dissolve or become uncooperative. With a weakened 
"threat point" in bargaining with her husband, a woman may be more likely to have to 
defer to her husband's preferences over fertility and other household decisions. As 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, while traditional sources of support such as 




support is especially relevant for bargaining power in the context of sub-Saharan 
Africa due to the importance of kin relations relative to conjugal relations. 
Anthropologist have noted that couples often maintain separate budgets and 
husband's may not offset drops in a woman's income (Doss 1996; Duflo and Udry, 
2003; Seebens, 2005). 
Shocks to kin support are measured via the woman's retrospective history of 
her siblings' births and deaths in the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS). As in 
Chapter 2, the sample used in this analysis consists of a cross-section of couples 
pooled from DHS surveys in the West African countries of Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Cameroon, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Niger, and Senegal. I demonstrate the relevance of 
the sibling deaths for measures of women's reported decision making authority in the 
household. I focus in particular on the say the woman has in major household 
purchases given the salience of control over economic decisions in the literature on 
the determinants of female bargaining power (Anderson and Eswaran, 2009; Kantor, 
2003; Friedberg and Webb, 2006). A regression of this measure of women's 
bargaining power on the sibling deaths confirms a negative relationship, robust to the 
inclusion of controls for village fixed effects and variety of controls for couple and 
household characteristics, and characteristics of the woman's natal family. I also 
confirm that the sibling deaths affect the woman's say over other household decisions 
in the expected direction. Finally, I address a concern that a spurious negative 
correlation between bargaining power and sibling deaths may arise if fertility causes a 
decrease in bargaining power, and sibling deaths and fertility are positively correlated 




for women's number of children in IV regressions of women's say over large 
household on sibling deaths and find the effect is unchanged and robust. 
Finally, I test for the causal relationship of interest and assess whether a 
woman's fertility increases in response to a decrease in her bargaining power. Using a 
woman's retrospective fertility and sibling birth and death history, I construct a panel 
at the couple-marriage year level recording her births and sibling deaths over the 
marriage. Estimating a differences-in-differences model, I find that after removing 
mean couple fertility, common country-year effects, and the effects of time-varying 
couple characteristics, a couple is on average 2.5 percentage points more likely to 
have a child in any given year after the woman has experienced an additional young 
sibling death during her marriage. This effect represents about 8 percent of the sample 
mean for the probability of a live birth in a given year. The effect is robust to the 
inclusion of a variety of further controls and fixed effects. Moreover, I examine the 
timing of changes in fertility relative to the sibling death by including dummies for 
leads and lags of the death in the baseline differences-in-differences specification. I 
find that, consistent with a causal effect of the sibling death on fertility operating 
through the bargaining power channel, there is no statistically significant effect on 
fertility in the years before, the year of, and the year after the death. In the second 
year after the death, the effect on fertility jumps to about 6 percentage points and is 
maintained at an elevated, though declining level. This pattern is consistent with 
initial excess pregnancies in response to the shock occurring in the first year after the 
death, followed by births in the second year and a few years afterwards. 




used to identify the causal effect of women's bargaining power on fertility. Section 3 
describes the cross-sectional data on couples and the construction of the panel data 
set. Section 4 presents results followed by concluding remarks. 
 
3.2  Empirical Strategy 
This paper attempts to test the hypothesis that changes in a woman's 
bargaining power relative to her husband during her marriage will cause a change in 
the couple's fertility behavior. Given that women on average prefer fewer children 
than men, the implication of the hypothesis is that a decrease in a woman's bargaining 
power will move the couple's fertility closer toward her husband's preferences. In a 
population such as West Africa in which men on average prefer more children (see 
Figure 3.1a and Figure 3.1b), a bargaining model of fertility predicts that a shift in 
bargaining power toward men will result in an increase in fertility. The structural 
relationship of interest can be represented by equation (1): 
                                        5ℎ	6 = ! + 	6 + 7	6 + 	6                                      (1) 
Where 5ℎ	6 indicates whether woman  gave birth in year  , and is a function of 
her bargaining power, 	6, relative to her husband at the time of the fertility 
decision, and a vector of factors affecting fertility, 	6. Parameter  captures how a 
change in a woman's bargaining power, after the union has formed, influences the 
probability the woman gives birth in a particular year.
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 A couple is likely to bargain implicitly or explicitly over aspects of fertility other than the 
number of children, but factors such as the gender composition of their children and the 
spacing of births.  This bargaining itself is taking place within a larger context of bargaining 
over other household decisions.  Fertility itself is focused on in this paper given the 




Straightforward estimation of equation (1) is unlikely to lead to estimation of 
the desired structural parameter due to the risk of omitted variable bias from several 
sources. First, estimates utilizing variation in the amount of bargaining power across 
women risk confounding due to unobserved factors that vary across groups such as 
unobserved social norms which govern both appropriate women's status, fertility 
preferences, and attitudes toward family planning among other factors. 
Secondly, bargaining power may affect pairing on the marriage market 
leading to the appearance of a spurious relationship between bargaining power and 
the couple's observed behavior. For example, vulnerable women may be paired with 
controlling men who impose their preference for larger family sizes. Likewise, some 
men, inclined to share power with women, may also have preferences for smaller 
family sizes. Such phenomena would lead to a negative correlation between women's 
bargaining power and fertility, but the relationship would not be causal. 
A further difficulty in recovering  is that true bargaining power is not 
directly observed, and must be inferred from observed proxies, such as reported 
decision-making authority or proximate determinants of bargaining power. The use of 
observed measures of bargaining power, however, risks the introduction of 
simultaneity bias in that fertility decisions and women's observed decision-making 
authority are likely to be jointly determined through an implicit bargaining process. 
For example, a woman may tacitly agree not to interfere with household financial 
decisions in an implicit exchange for control over fertility. Similarly, a husband may 
cede some control over household decisions if his fertility or sexual activity desires 




would be positively correlated, but the relationship would not be causal. 
 
3.2.1  Kin Support Shocks 
These potential sources of bias suggest the use of exogenous variation in 
bargaining power. As the examples above illustrate, inferring the effect of bargaining 
power on fertility can pose challenges when exploiting variation in the level of 
bargaining power across couples. This study attempts to circumvent these challenges 
by instead exploiting a source of variation in bargaining power varying within a 
couple over time. I match shocks to a determinant of a woman's bargaining power, 
her kin support, to a couple's year-by-year marital fertility history. Constructing a 
bargaining power shifter which varies at the couple-level allows for the use of couple 
fixed-effects which restricts identifying variation to variation within the same couple 
over time, rather than relying on variation across couples as has often been necessary 
in previous studies. Kin support is particularly suited as a bargaining power shifter in 
the context of West Africa given both the importance of traditional sources of social 
support for women, and also the separate nature of spouses' kinship ties. 
This paper will use the birth and death history of a woman's siblings in the 
DHS to create a time-series of shocks to a woman's kin support as captured by the 
post-marriage deaths of a woman's younger siblings. The variable ℎ records the 
number of a woman's siblings, 10 years old or under, who have died since the 
beginning of the couple's marriage up to the previous year. The variable captures 







Deaths of the woman's young siblings function as an indication that the 
woman's natal family has suffered a negative shock. The measure is limited to post-
marriage deaths in order to focus on shocks occurring after household formation. 
Shocks occurring before a couple's marriage may have impacted the types of men and 
women who marry along unobserved dimensions relevant for later fertility outcomes. 
The deaths of siblings older than 10 years are not included in the preferred 
specifications in order to avoid that these siblings directly affect fertility. Adolescent 
and adult siblings may directly affect the cost of child rearing by offering help and 
support for child care. 
 
3.2.2  Validity 
The validity of using a woman's sibling deaths as a shock to kin support to 
consistently estimate the causal effect of bargaining power on fertility, β, in the 
structural equation requires that, in addition to being relevant for bargaining power, 
the sibling deaths also be uncorrelated with other determinants of fertility. Also of 
interest and useful from a policy perspective, however, is to infer just the sign of  β, 
as well as placing bounds on its magnitude. In order to estimate the sign of β, one 
needs to satisfy a weaker condition that the possible biases in the estimate of β be of 
the opposite sign. That is, in the case of the bargaining power theory of fertility which 
predicts a positive β, if the estimated parameter is found to be positive and potentially 
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La Ferrara et al. (2008) time the measure of their treatment variable, TV channel 






biased downward, then one can infer that the sign of β is positive and bounded below 
by the estimate. Next I discuss possible channels other than bargaining power through 
which sibling deaths might affect fertility and the implications of these possibilities 
for characterizing the causal effect of bargaining power on fertility. 
First, a concern may be that the shock represented by the sibling death could 
cut support to the woman from her natal family to support further children. Therefore, 
rather than solely representing a shift in a woman's bargaining power relative to her 
husband, the sibling death captures a reduction in a woman's receipt of transfers from 
her natal family. Analogous to this channel would be if the woman experienced the 
same shock as her natal family and suffers a decrease in income as a result. Studies in 
the developing country context have found that households shift or reduce fertility in 
response to economic shocks (Bhalotra et al., 2009; McKenzie, 2003; Sabarwal et al., 
2011). Should such an income shock channel be in effect, it would generate a zero or 
negative correlation between sibling deaths and fertility - in the opposite direction of 
the prediction of the bargaining power theory.
20
 Therefore, a positive reduced form 
estimate of sibling deaths on fertility would be evidence in favor of the bargaining 
power channel, albeit with a point estimate potentially biased downward. Similar 
reasoning would apply to a decrease in fertility due to grief stemming from the loss of 
a sibling, or the loss of future assistance for child rearing due to the sibling death. 
One may also argue that the death of a woman’s sibling could make more 
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The relationship between ℎ, the number of post-marriage sibling deaths to date, and 
fertility could be zero if the timing of fertility is merely shifted, but eventually completed. 
Such an effect could be the case for couples below natural fertility. For couples who would 
have otherwise been at natural fertility levels, a delay due to a shock would result in lower 






resources available to the woman.  In such a scenario, a unitary model of the 
household in which children are regarded as normal or luxury goods would also 
predict an increase in fertility.   Yet, a unitary model would not predict that changes 
in the source of income should alter decision-making authority in the household.  
Therefore, evidence of shifts in bargaining power in response to changes in a 
woman’s family would not be consistent with the unitary model, and serves as an 
empirical test to distinguish between the bargaining and unitary models of the 
household.  Likewise, a mechanism based on a woman’s parents demanding children 
from the woman to replace the deceased sibling does not readily predict a decrease in 
her bargaining power. 
Yet another channel to consider which may lead to a correlation between 
sibling deaths and fertility is through a sibling death's effect on couple's expectations 
of the likelihood of child mortality. Couples expecting a higher child mortality may 
increase their fertility in order to ensure the survival of a sufficient number of 
children. In order to address this possibility, I include in some specifications controls 
for the mortality of the couple's children, as well as a measure of the young sibling 
deaths of the other couples in the same village in order to control for the couple's 
expectations of mortality.   
 
3.2.3  Kin Support Shocks and Bargaining Power 
I next turn to establishing the relevance of the sibling deaths for bargaining 
power. I initially follow the same approach as in Chapter 2 to establish that the sibling 




power based on a woman's reported decision-making authority over household 
decisions. Due to the emphasis on control over economic resources in the literature on 
the determinants of bargaining power, I focus in particular on a woman's reported say 
over major household purchases. A dummy is created indicating a woman reports 
having some say over major household purchases. Dummies are also created for 
responses regarding a woman's say over her own health care, daily household 
purchases, and which food to be cooked each day. 
Unlike the sibling death and fertility history data, the bargaining power 
proxies capture decision-making authority only at the time of interview. Therefore, 
tests based on the effect of variation in sibling deaths on bargaining power for a 
couple over time are not possible. In light of such an analysis, I estimate the effect of 
young sibling deaths over the course of the marriage for couples on current measures 
of a woman's bargaining power.  I also test whether recent sibling deaths have a 
stronger effect on women’s current reported decision-making authority as would be 
expected if women’s bargaining power over time responded to kin support shocks. 
Specifically, I estimate equation (2a) and equation (2b) which display the 
regression of the decision-making authority for the woman in couple  in village  
with  eligible siblings, 	 on the number of young sibling deaths occurring since 
the beginning of the marriage, ℎ	 ,  where 	 is a vector of controls;    
village fixed effects; and   fixed effects for the number, , of young siblings alive at 
the time of the woman's marriage or born subsequently in order to control for 
differences across women in the number of siblings who could have died.  Equation 




and greater than five years ago. 
	 = ! + !ℎ	 + !	 +   +   + "	                                          (2a) 




8=	+  +   + "	                                                                               (2b) 
A concern in OLS estimation of equation (2a) or (2b) is that if sibling deaths 
are correlated with fertility, then the effect of ℎ on women's reported bargaining 
power at the time of interview will be biased if fertility enters on the right-hand side 
of equation (2a) or (2b). The number of a woman's children could affect women's 
bargaining power, for example, via child care preventing the woman's employment 
outside the home. As fertility and bargaining power are therefore likely jointly 
determined, variables measuring fertility cannot be entered as a control in an OLS 
estimation of equation (2a) or (2b). To address this issue, I estimate a two-stage least 
squares regression (2SLS) in which fertility is instrumented by the proportion of the 
woman's births which were twin births. Separately, I also instrument with a dummy 
for whether either of the woman's first two births were twin births.
21
 Specifically, I 
estimate the following first-stage, equation (3a), and second-stage, equation (3b):           
>ℎ	 = ? + ?ℎ	 + ?@	 + ?;	 +   +   + A	          (3a)       
	 = B + Bℎ	 + B>ℎ	 + B;	 +   +   + C	               (3b) 
Where >ℎ	 is the woman's current number of living children and alternatively 
the number of children under five years old in the household. Given that the 
occurrence of twins is an arguably exogenous event, and strongly correlated with the 
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dummy for whether either of the first two births was a twin birth as there was no first stage as 






number of children a woman has to-date, it serves as a useful instrument in order to 
consistently estimate the effect of young sibling deaths on a woman's reported 
bargaining power conditional on the number of children she has. 
 
3.2.4  Kin Support Shocks and Fertility 
3.2.4.1 Differences-in-Differences Specification 
Having tested for the relevance of the kin support shocks for bargaining 
power, the next step is to exploit this variation to infer the causal effect of bargaining 
power on fertility. In the sample, the woman's reported bargaining power is observed 
only at the date of interview, whereas her births and sibling deaths are recorded over 
time. Therefore, in order to take advantage of the variation over time, a reduced form 
approach is taken here for causal identification rather than attempting an instrumental 
variable strategy. An instrumental variable strategy would not be advised in any event 
due to the fact that bargaining power is noisily captured in the data by women's 
decision-making power in the household. As a result, the exclusion restriction for an 
instrumental variables strategy is unlikely to hold as the kin support measures will 
remain correlated with aspects of bargaining power relevant for fertility which are not 
captured by the proxies for bargaining power. 
In the first set of results, I infer the causal effect of bargaining power on 
fertility from the reduced form effect of young sibling deaths through the previous 
year on the probability a woman gives birth in a particular year. The full retrospective 
history of a woman's fertility is built from her responses in the DHS cross-sectional 




for married women based on each year of marriage. The following linear probability 
model is estimated: 
                              5ℎ	6 = 	6Ф +  ℎ	6 + E	 + #6 + 	6                               (4) 
where 5ℎ	6 is equal to 1 if woman  gives birth to a child in year ; ℎ	6 is the 
number of post-marriage young sibling deaths that have occurred through year  − 1;  
E	 are couple fixed effects and #6 are country-year fixed effects. The variables in 	6  
include the woman and her husband's age and age-squared, the stock of children the 
woman had up to year , a dummy variable for whether the woman gave birth in year  
 − 1.  A variable for birth in the previous year is included in order to account for 
reduced fertility due to postpartum amenorrhea.
22
  Additional specifications included 
for robustness include controls for whether a child of the couple died in year  − 1, 
the number of living young and adult siblings, the number of the couple's children 
which have died to date, and fixed effects for mother age, year of marriage, country - 
mother age - year, woman-decade of age, and village-year. Standard errors are 




   
In the ideal econometric case, shocks to kin support would be independent, 
random events - resulting (or randomly resulting) in a young sibling death. In such a 
case estimation of equation (4) will result in an unbiased estimate of γ, the reduced 
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 See Field (2003) and La Ferrara et al. (2008) for examples of fertility specifications using 
birth in the previous year to account for infertility from postpartum amenorrhea. 
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 Wooldridge (1995) and Semykina and Wooldridge (2010) give conditions under which 
fixed effects estimation of an unbalanced panel is consistent.  In particular, the selection 
process resulting in missing observations for some units must be strictly exogenous 
conditional on covariates and the unit fixed effect.  In the model in this paper, couples have 
greater or fewer marriage years in part based on observable covariates such as their year of 
birth and age of marriage.  To the extent that unobservable characteristics of the couple are 
driving the selection process, the couple fixed effect will capture any time invariant factors. 
24
 Following Cameron and Trivedi (2005), sampling weights are not used as the paper takes 




form effect of sibling deaths on the probability of birth in a given year. In practice, 
however, the occurrence of young sibling deaths has both an idiosyncratic and 
systematic component. Systematic components may include the socioeconomic status 
of the woman's natal family, geographically distributed shocks over time such as crop 
failure, as well as mechanically the size of a woman's sibship. Yet despite these 
systematic components, the timing and occurrence of shocks to the natal family likely 
continue to have a significant idiosyncratic component based on the random timing of 
fortunate and unfortunate events occurring to households and individuals. 
The fixed effects model in equation (4) attempts to exploit the idiosyncratic 
component of the timing of shocks to the woman's natal family by purging the 
variation due to systematic components through couple and country-year fixed effects 
in the baseline specification, and a variety of other fixed effects and controls in other 
specifications. With the idiosyncratic component remaining, those women never 
experiencing deaths and those women with deaths later in the marital period serve as 
a counterfactual for those women experiencing deaths. 
Establishing that post-marriage young sibling deaths negatively affect a 
woman's bargaining power, and do not affect fertility through other channels 
conditional on covariates, implies that a positive effect of ℎ	6 on the likelihood 
a woman gives birth in a particular year can be interpreted as evidence of a negative 
effect of bargaining power on fertility. As discussed above, to the extent that concerns 
remain about correlation of ℎ	6 with fertility through other channels, estimates 
of the magnitude of the negative effect of bargaining power on fertility are likely to 




To further explore the bargaining power mechanism, I also test whether the 
effect of young sibling deaths is increasing in the difference in the man and woman’s 
respective reports of their ideal number of children.
25
  A husband with a higher ideal 
number of children should be more motivated to exploit a woman’s weaker 
bargaining position to shift the couple’s fertility to his preference.  Similarly, I 
interact the sibling deaths with the man’s stock of sons in each year.  A man with a 
greater number of sons may be less motivated to exploit bargaining power to increase 
fertility.
26
   
Finally, to address concerns that the exact timing of the deaths is more safely 
random than whether a woman ever experienced a death, I also estimate the model for 
the sub-sample of couples with women who ever experienced a post-marriage young 
sibling death. 
 
3.2.4.2 Inferring Causality from the Timing of Sibling 
Deaths 
 
In order to further investigate the causal relationship between young sibling 
deaths and fertility, I consider the timing of the deaths relative to the fertility 
outcome. Consider the following equation (5) in which leads and lags of a dummy for 
the occurrence of a young sibling death in a particular year augment the specification 
in equation (4): 
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 These reports are unfortunately ex-post and may not have represented the couple’s feelings 
at the time of the fertility decision and therefore results must be interpreted with caution. 
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 Women express a slight preference for a greater proportion of sons to daughters in the 
sample, whereas men’s preference is more pronounced.  Women prefer on average 53 percent 




5ℎ	6 = 	6 +  G=H	,G= +  G;H	,G; + ⋯ +  H	, + ⋯ +  J:H	,J: +  JKH	,JK +
                      JLH	,JL M9NOPNQ + E	 + #6 + 	6                                                              (5) 
Where H	, is a dummy for a young sibling death in year , H	,GR is a dummy for a 
young sibling death occurring  years into the future, H	,GR is a dummy for a young 
sibling deaths  years before.  H	,JL M9NOPNQ is a dummy equal to 1 in every year 
beginning with the seventh year after a sibling death has occurred. 
Estimation of equation (5) will allow for i) a test of reverse causality, ii) a test 
of whether the couple's fertility and the sibling death are both affected by a common 
shock, iii) a test of the effect of a "placebo" treatment to further test for causality, and 
iv) an assessment of the dynamics of the effect of sibling deaths on fertility - that is, 
does the impact accelerate, stabilize, or revert to the mean.
27
 
The discrete specification in equation (4) could obscure reverse causality in 
which the couple's fertility outcome affects the mortality of the woman's young 
siblings if, for example, the woman allocates less time to assisting in the rearing of 
her younger siblings after the birth of her child. Positive coefficients on the treatment 
leads,  GR, would be an indication that the couple's fertility outcome may be affecting 
the mortality of the woman's siblings - contrary to an interpretation in which the 
sibling deaths indicate shocks to kin support which subsequently impact the couple's 
fertility. Negative coefficients on the treatment leads would suggest that the couple's 
fertility declines prior to the death of a woman's siblings. If the coefficients on the 
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This specification draws on the analysis conducted in Autor (2003) of the effect of changes 
employment contract law on firm's hiring of temporary employees. La Ferrara et al. (2008) 
employ a similar test at the regional level testing for the effect of the introduction of soap 





lags are in turn positive this would suggest that the couple is merely shifting fertility 
in time perhaps because the couple is experiencing the same shock as the woman's 
natal family or have temporarily ceased receiving direct support from the natal 
family. Treatment leads, particularly longer leads, can also be thought of as a 
falsification test using placebo treatments. Women who will experience a young 
sibling death in three, four, or five years should not presently alter their fertility if kin 
support shocks shift bargaining power which subsequently shifts fertility. 
 
3.3  Data 
3.3.1  Sample Construction 
Using the same group of countries as in Chapter 2, couples are pooled from 
households surveyed in the DHS from the countries of Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Cameroon, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Niger, and Senegal.
28
 These countries in West 
Africa were selected because they included a detailed fertility history, questions 
regarding women's decision-making authority, and included women's sibling 
mortality history.   
The sample used in this analysis consists of couples in which at least one of 
the spouses is in their first marriage.  The DHS does not ask directly for the date of 
respondent's current marriage, but rather the date of the respondent's first marriage.  If 
either spouse or both are in their first marriage, then the couple's marital duration can 
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be obtained from their responses for the date of first marriage.  The date of marriage 
is used critically to define which sibling deaths occurred post-marriage.  In total, 
14,981 couples have data for marital duration, sibling and fertility history, and 
women's decision-making authority. Additionally, 80 women who identify as 
daughters of the head of household are excluded from the sample as the woman's 
natal household would be equivalent to the couple's household rendering use of the 
kin support measures for these households inappropriate. This leaves a final sample 
of 14,901 couples. 
The cross-sectional data set for couples is used to investigate the relevance of 
sibling deaths for bargaining power measures. The retrospective histories of a 
woman's siblings and fertility allow for the construction of a panel data set for a 
richer study of the reduced form effect of sibling deaths on fertility as discussed 
above. A panel is constructed for each year of the couple's marriage given that the 
effect of changes in bargaining power during marriage on fertility is under study. This 
transformation results in an unbalanced panel with a total of 207,208 observations. 
Table 3.1 displays descriptive statistics for the key variables in the paper. 
 
3.4  Econometric results 
3.4.1  Sibling Deaths and Bargaining Power 
Table 3.2a displays OLS estimates of the effect of post-marriage young 
sibling deaths on the likelihood a woman has say over major household purchases. An 




decrease in the likelihood the woman reports having say over major household 
purchases. Given that 36 percent of the sample reports having some say over major 
household purchases, the effect represents 5 percent of the sample mean. The effect is 
significant at the 5 percent level and robust to the inclusion of village fixed effects as 
well as a variety of controls for couple and woman's natal family characteristics.  
Table 3.2b displays results of the effect of the timing of young sibling deaths on 
women’s current reported decision making authority across couples.  The table 
reveals that the average effect is driven in large part by sibling deaths less than two 
years ago.  An additional young sibling death within the last two years results in 
about a 7 percent decline in the likelihood a woman has say over major household 
purchases.  The effect size decreases with distance from the present and is only 
statistically significant for the most recent deaths.   
Table 3.3 displays the effect of the sibling deaths on other measures of 
women's bargaining power such as say over her own health care, daily household 
purchases, and food to be cooked each day. The effects are in the expected direction, 
but roughly half the size of women's say over large household purchases, and not 
statistically significant. Nevertheless, overall the estimates suggest a woman's 
decision-making authority is affected by shocks to the woman's kin support. 
Estimates using the deaths of siblings under the age of 20 demonstrate a similar 
effect. 
Estimates of the effect of sibling deaths on women's reported decision-making 
authority in Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 may be biased due to correlation between sibling 




through alternate channels unrelated to bargaining power and fertility outcomes 
subsequently affect bargaining power, the estimates in Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 may 
give the spurious appearance that shocks to kin support cause a decrease in 
bargaining power. As discussed above, I test for this possibility by conducting a 2SLS 
regression in which measures of a woman's fertility are included in regressions of 
woman's say on sibling deaths and instrument for the fertility outcomes by the 
woman's proportion of twin births and alternatively a dummy for either of the first 
two births being a twin birth. Results are presented in Table 3.4 for a woman's say 
over major household purchases. Controlling and instrumenting for either the 
woman's number of living children or children in the household under the age of 5 are 
very similar to and confirm the estimates in Table 3.2. Overall, these results suggest a 
robust effect of the sibling deaths on measures of a woman's bargaining power, 
particularly as measured by control over major household economic decisions. 
 
3.4.2  Reduced Form Effect of Sibling Deaths on Fertility 
Next I turn to estimates of the reduced form effect of sibling deaths on 
fertility. Column 1 of Table 3.5 displays baseline estimates of equation (4) on the 
panel of couple-marriage year observations. The model is estimated as a linear 
probability model with standard errors clustered by couple. The dependent variable in 
each regression, 5ℎ	6, is a dummy equal to 1 if woman  gave birth in year , and 
otherwise 0. The variable of interest, ℎ	6, records the number of post-marriage 
deaths of siblings age 10 and under the woman has experienced up through year  −




age-squared in year ; their respective stocks of children in year ,29 and their square; 
and a dummy for whether the woman gave birth in the previous year. The results 
indicate that after removing the effects of these controls, mean couple fertility, and 
common country-year effects, a couple is on average 2.5 percentage points more 
likely to have a child in any given year after the woman has experienced an additional 
post-marriage young sibling death. The mean probability of birth in a year in the 
sample is 0.28. Therefore, the effect represents about 8 percent of the sample mean.  
The magnitude of the effect is sensitive to the inclusion of an indicator for birth in the 
previous year as displayed in Column 1 of Table 3.6.  In this specification a couple is 
on average 1.4 percentage points more likely to have a child.  The smaller effect 
remains, however, statistically and economically significant.   
Panel A of Table 3.6 displays results based on variations in the baseline 
specification of equation (4). The results appear robust to the inclusion of a variety of 
controls including the previous child mortality experienced by the couple as well as 
the woman's number of young, adolescent, and adult siblings. Particularly noteworthy 
are columns (4), (7), and (8) in which the effect is robust to the inclusion of fixed 
effects for country by year by woman's age (equivalently country-cohort by year), 
village by year, and woman by decade of life (i.e. her 20s, 30s etc.). Panel B of Table 
3.6 estimates the baseline specification using sibling deaths under 20 years old 
finding broadly similar effects. Panels C and D repeat the estimation on the sub-
                                                 
29
The stock of children of the man may be different than the woman if the man has other 
wives or either member of the couple were previously married. Field (2003) discusses the 
particular importance of controlling for women's birth parity in fertility regressions due to 






sample of couples in which the woman has experienced a young sibling death at some 
point in the marriage. Comparison with these estimates is useful as it is robust to 
concerns that despite the controls and fixed effects that have been included in the 
specifications, women who have never had a post-marriage young sibling death are 
not an appropriate counterfactual for women who have experienced the deaths. The 
results for these estimations are very similar to Panels A and B with the exception of 
column 8, which though significantly larger still indicates a positive reduced form 
effect of sibling deaths on the probability of birth. 
Columns (3) of Table 3.5 explores the interaction of disagreement between the 
husband and wife in their reported ideal number of children with young sibling 
deaths.  A bargaining power mechanism would suggest that the greater the husband’s 
ideal point relative to the woman’s, the more important shifts in bargaining should be 
for fertility outcomes.  The interaction effect in Column (3) is positive in the expected 
direction, however not statistically significant.  One must keep in mind that the 
reported ideal number of children is measured at the date of interview and may not 
correspond to the couple’s sentiments at the time of the fertility decision.   
Columns (4) and (5) of Table 3.5 test the bargaining mechanism further by 
interacting the sibling deaths with the man’s stock of sons and daughters respectively.  
Results indicate that a man with a greater stock of sons reduces the effect of sibling 
deaths on fertility.  Each additional son reduces the effect by 0.5 percentage points 
relative to an average effect of 2.5 percentage points and is statistically significant at 
the 5 percent level.  The effect of the stock of daughters has a point estimate which 




results are consistent with the bargaining mechanism in that a shift in bargaining 
power induced by kin support shocks is less acute the greater the number of sons he 
has. 
The presence of a causal effect of kin support shocks on fertility can be further 
examined by considering the timing of changes in fertility in response to shocks. 
Figure 3.2 graphs the point estimates of the estimation of equation (5) with leads and 
lags of the sibling death shown in column 2 of Table 3.5. The coefficient on the 
effects in the years prior to the sibling death are not significantly different from zero 
suggesting the lack of reverse causality stemming from the couple's birth to higher 
sibling mortality. Likewise, in the year of death and the first year after, the probability 
of birth is very close to zero, followed by a spike significantly different from zero 
from the second year to the fifth year after the death, which subsequently dissipates. 
This pattern is consistent with a kin support shock which causes an increased 
likelihood of pregnancy, but not birth, in the first year after the sibling death, 
followed by a continuous period of higher likelihood of fertility.  The estimated 
probability of birth does not turn negative after the spike following a young sibling 
death indicating that the effect is not a shift in timing, but a change in total fertility. 
Finally, Table 3.7 subjects the baseline specification to further testing through the 
addition of the same variety of controls and fixed effects as in Table 3.6. The pattern 
is broadly upheld, though point estimates lose statistical significance in some 
specifications perhaps due in part to the inclusion of so many fixed effects. 
Overall, the reduced form estimates of the effect of young sibling deaths on 




empirical implications of plausible alternatives. Alternative channels which 
negatively affect a couple's ability or willingness to have a child are inconsistent with 
a positive reduced form effect of sibling deaths on fertility. Examples of such 
mechanisms are a common shock which affects both the woman's natal family and 
the couple, or a reduction in labor or resources from the natal family to support the 
woman's fertility. Furthermore, the lack of a negative effect on fertility in the years 
surrounding the sibling death suggests the couple is not shifting the timing of fertility 
in response to an income shock, a reduction in direct support from the woman's natal 
family, or as a response to grief.
30
  The empirical support for the bargaining power 
channel is consistent with several studies that have found evidence contrary to the 
unitary model of the household. 
 
3.5  Conclusions 
This paper has assessed the effect of a woman's bargaining power relative to 
her husband on a couple's fertility. Shocks to a determinant of bargaining power, 
women's kin support, varying within couples over time are used to identify the causal 
effect. Kin support shocks are captured by deaths of a woman's young siblings. Such 
deaths are argued to be an indication that the woman's natal family has suffered a 
negative shock. I exploit differences in the timing of these shocks across couples to 
estimate how changes in a woman's bargaining power impact a couple's fertility. I 
find that, after controlling for time invariant couple characteristics, common country-
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year effects, and time varying controls, shocks to a woman's kin support lead to 
significantly higher fertility. The effect is robust to removing village-year, and 
country-cohort-year effects among other controls. Moreover, exploring the dynamics 
of fertility changes relative to the timing of the shocks confirms that fertility changes 
occur after the shocks with no effect in the years prior to the event. These results are 
consistent with a mechanism in which kin support shocks worsen women's bargaining 
power leading to fertility outcomes closer to the generally higher fertility preferences 
of husbands. Furthermore, I argue that to the extent sibling deaths may affect fertility 
through channels other than bargaining power, the estimated effect is likely to be 
biased toward zero, maintaining the validity of inference on the direction of causation 
and providing a useful lower bound on the magnitude. 
These findings validate efforts to promote gender equality and the 
empowerment of women as a means of improving maternal health. The findings also 
point to the equally important conclusion that efforts must be undertaken to 
understand how fertility and maternal health can be improved despite women's lower 
bargaining position relative to their spouse. Consistent with a bargaining model, 
recent experimental studies have found the importance of improving women's access 
to information and the particular importance of having the opportunity to choose 
concealable forms of contraception not subject to de facto spousal consent (Ashraf et 
al., 2010). Further research is warranted on how improved maternal health and 
fertility outcomes can be achieved by both improving women's bargaining power and 









































































































Figure 3.2: Estimated impact of leads and lags of young sibling death on the probability the 
Vertical lines represent +/- 1.96 
-0.08
-0.06
Years Before or After the Death of a Woman's Young 
88
Mean Std. Dev. Number of Obs
Woman Has Say in Large Household Purchases (0/1) 0.36 0.48 14,901
Woman Has Say in Own Healthcare (0/1) 0.30 0.46 12,894
Woman Has Say in Daily Household Purchases (0/1) 0.48 0.50 14,879
Woman Has Say in Food to be Cooked Each Day (0/1) 0.71 0.45 12,774
Woman's Age 30.1 8.06 14,901
Husband's Age 39.4 9.41 14,901
Woman's Years of Education 1.67 3.25 14,885
Husband's Years of Education 3.23 4.56 14,870
Polygamous Union (0/1) 0.33 0.47 14,901
Marital Duration 12.3 8.08 14,901
Muslim Husband (0/1) 0.58 0.49 14,887
Christian Husband (0/1) 0.31 0.46 14,887
Number of Post-Marriage Young Sibling Deaths (10 and under) 0.10 0.43 14,901
Number of Post-Marriage Young Sibling Deaths (under 20) 0.14 0.47 14,901
Number of Eligible Post-Marriage Young Siblings (10 and under) 1.34 1.82 14,901
Number of Eligible Post-Marriage Young Siblings (under 20) 2.90 2.36 14,901
Number of Siblings Ever Born 5.65 2.53 14,901
Woman's Ideal Number of Children 6.16 2.67 13,702
Men's Ideal Number of Children 19.2 29.16 12,287
Woman's Ideal Number of Children (Median) 6
Men's Ideal Number of Children (Median) 8
Proportion of Births Twin-Births 0.017 0.07 14,141
First or Second Birth Twin-Birth 0.025 0.16 12,161
Woman gives birth (0/1) 0.28 0.45 207,208
Young sibling death occurs (10 years old and under) 0.01 0.09 207,208
Young sibling death occurs (under 20 years old) 0.01 0.11 207,208
Stock of children (woman) 2.22 2.06 207,208
Stock of children (man) 2.69 2.65 207,208
Woman's stock of young siblings 0.64 1.24 207,208
Woman's stock of male adolescent or adult siblings 1.81 1.45 207,208
Woman's stock of female adolescent or adult siblings 1.80 1.45 207,208
Woman's Age 25.93 7.44 207,208
Man's Age 34.86 8.76 207,208
Number of Children died through t-2 0.50 0.99 207,208
Table 3.1:  Summary Statistics
Notes:  This table consists of summary statistics for the sample of couples pooled from the Demographic and Health 
Surveys.  The countries included are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Niger, and Senegal.  
Panel A:  Couple Level
Panel B:  Couple - Marriage Year Level
89
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
  -0.019**   -0.022***   -0.017*   -0.018*   -0.016*
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
  -0.022***   -0.024***   -0.023***   -0.024***   -0.023***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Panel B:  Post-Marriage Sibling Deaths (under 20 years old)
Number of Sibling Deaths Under 20 Years Old
Additional Covariates For All Panels
Woman's Natal Family Characteristics:  Eligible Sibling 
Determinants
Woman's Natal Family Characteristics:  Child Mortality 
Determinants
Household Characteristics
Number of Sibling Deaths 10 Years Old and Under
Table 3.2a: The Effect of Young Sibling Deaths on Female Bargaining Power
Woman Has Say in Major Household Purchases (0/1)
Panel A:  Post-Marriage Sibling Deaths (10 years old and under)
N 14,901 14,289 13,869 13,792 13,524
Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. All regressions include village fixed-effects, fixed-effects for the number of eligible siblings, and controls for marital duration, age and age-squared
of the woman and her husband.  ** significant at 5%;  *** significant at 1%
Notes: Eligible siblings in the regressions in Panel A are siblings 10 years old or under at the time of the woman's marriage, or born subsequently. Eligible siblings in Panel B are siblings under 20 years old
at the time of the woman's marriage or born subsequently. Women's Natal Family Characteristics : (1) Eligible Sibling Determinants: fraction of siblings born before woman, average birth spacing of woman's
siblings, interaction of fraction born before and average birth spacing. (2) Child Mortality Determinants: number of sibling births in which the birth spacing was less than 24 months, proportion of siblings
that are male, woman's height as percent of median, proportion of siblings born before woman's marriage who died before age 5, number of pre-marriage young sibling deaths, number of siblings born
before woman's marriage. Household Characteristics : fixed effects for wealth index, and one indicator each for electricity, TV, and radio possession. Couple Characteristics : years of education each for woman
and husband, Muslim and Christian indicator each for husband and woman, indicators for husband's occupation categories, indicator for woman has been in multiple unions, indicators each for husband and 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of Sibling Deaths 10 Years Old 
and Under
    -0.069**     -0.074**     -0.077**     -0.079**     -0.072**
(0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
    -0.027     -0.027     -0.020     -0.019     -0.022
(0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
    -0.013     -0.016     -0.010     -0.012     -0.010
(0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011)
Table 3.2b: The Effect of Timing of Young Sibling Deaths on Female Bargaining Power
Woman Has Say in Major Household Purchases (0/1)
Deaths - 1 year ago or less
Deaths - More than 5 years ago
Deaths - 5 to 2 years ago
Additional Covariates For All Panels
Woman's Natal Family Characteristics:  
Eligible Sibling Determinants
Woman's Natal Family Characteristics:  
Child Mortality Determinants
N 14,901 14,289 13,869 13,792 13,524
Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. All regressions include village fixed-effects, fixed-effects for the number of eligible siblings, and controls for marital duration, age and age-squared
of the woman and her husband.  ** significant at 5%;  *** significant at 1%
Notes: Eligible siblings in the regressions in Panel A are siblings 10 years old or under at the time of the woman's marriage, or born subsequently. Eligible siblings in Panel B are siblings under 20 years old at
the time of the woman's marriage or born subsequently. Women's Natal Family Characteristics : (1) Eligible Sibling Determinants: fraction of siblings born before woman, average birth spacing of woman's
siblings, interaction of fraction born before and average birth spacing. (2) Child Mortality Determinants: number of sibling births in which the birth spacing was less than 24 months, proportion of siblings
that are male, woman's height as percent of median, proportion of siblings born before woman's marriage who died before age 5, number of pre-marriage young sibling deaths, number of siblings born before 
woman's marriage. Household Characteristics : fixed effects for wealth index, and one indicator each for electricity, TV, and radio possession. Couple Characteristics : years of education each for woman and
husband, Muslim and Christian indicator each for husband and woman, indicators for husband's occupation categories, indicator for woman has been in multiple unions, indicators each for husband and





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
-0.010 -0.010 -0.011 -0.009 -0.012 -0.004
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
-0.010 -0.009 -0.014 -0.013 -0.024** -0.014
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
N 12,913 11,785 14,893 13,518 12,785 11,675
Panel B:  Post-Marriage Sibling Deaths (under 20 years old)
Number of Sibling Deaths 
Under 20 Years Old
Additional Covariates For All Panels
Woman's Natal Family, 
Household, and Couple 
Characteristics
Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. All regressions include village fixed-effects, fixed-effects for the number of eligible siblings, and controls for marital
duration, age and age-squared of the woman and her husband.  ** significant at 5%;  *** significant at 1%
Number of Sibling Deaths 10 
Years Old and Under
Table 3.3: The Effect of Young Sibling Deaths on Other Measures of Female Bargaining Power
Woman Has Say Over Her Own 
Healthcare (0/1)
Woman Has Say in Daily 
Household Purchases (0/1)
Woman Has Say Over Food to be 
Cooked Each Day (0/1)
Panel A:  Post-Marriage Sibling Deaths (10 years old and under)
Notes: Eligible siblings in the regressions in Panel A are siblings 10 years old or under at the time of the woman's marriage, or born subsequently. Eligible siblings in Panel B are
siblings under 20 years old at the time of the woman's marriage or born subsequently. Women's Natal Family Characteristics : (1) Eligible Sibling Determinants: fraction of siblings born
before woman, average birth spacing of woman's siblings, interaction of fraction born before and average birth spacing. (2) Child Mortality Determinants: number of sibling births in
which the birth spacing was less than 24 months, proportion of siblings that are male, woman's height as percent of median, proportion of siblings born before woman's marriage who
died before age 5, number of pre-marriage young sibling deaths, number of siblings born before woman's marriage. Household Characteristics : fixed effects for wealth index, and one
indicator each for TV, and radio possession. Couple Characteristics : years of education each for woman and husband, Muslim and Christian indicator each for husband and woman,
indicators for husband's occupation categories, indicator for woman has been in multiple unions, indicators each for husband and woman for whether they identify the relationship as
married or just living together, indicator for couple is in a polygamous union, indicators for relationship to head of household each for husband and woman. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
2.15*** 2.05*** 2.13*** 2.03*** 0.990*** 0.883*** 0.997*** 0.891***
(0.211) (.226) (0.210) (0.225) (0.177) (0.176) (0.177) (0.176)
0.425*** 0.414*** 0.435*** 0.422***
(0.102) (0.107) (0.102) (0.107)
Partial F-Statistic 104.30 82.67 102.18 81.65 31.33 25.14 31.82 25.63 17.39 14.94 18.31 15.53
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
-0.020** -0.014 -0.020** -0.014 -0.017 -0.014
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013)
-0.021*** -0.019** -0.023*** -0.021** -0.019** -0.018*
(0.026) -0.009 (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
-0.037 -0.034 -0.038 -0.033 -0.041 -0.065 -0.041 -0.066
(0.026) (0.029) (0.026) (0.029) (0.066) (0.072) (0.064) (0.071)
-0.080 -0.078 -0.080 -0.075
(0.058) (0.069) (0.057) (0.068)
Proportion of Woman's Births that 
were Twin-Births
Either of First Two Births Twin-Births 
(0/1)
Table 3.4: The Effect of Young Sibling Deaths on Female Bargaining Power, Controlling and Instrumenting for Fertility
Number of Sibling Deaths 10 Years 
Old and Under
Woman Has Say in Major Household Purchases (0/1)
Panel A:  First Stage
Panel B:  2SLS Second Stage
Woman's No. of Living Children Number of Children Living in the Household 5 Years Old and Under
Number of Children Living in the 
Household 5 yrs old and under
Number of Sibling Deaths Under 20 
Years Old
Number of Living Children
N 13,798 12,417 13,798 12,417 13,798 12,417 13,798 12,417 11,713 10,514 11,713 10,514
Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. All regressions include village fixed-effects, fixed-effects for the number of eligible siblings, and controls for marital duration, age and age-squared
of the woman and her husband.  ** significant at 5%;  *** significant at 1%
Notes: Eligible siblings in the regressions in Panel A are siblings 10 years old or under at the time of the woman's marriage, or born subsequently. Eligible siblings in Panel B are siblings under 20 years old at
the time of the woman's marriage or born subsequently. Women's Natal Family Characteristics : (1) Eligible Sibling Determinants: fraction of siblings born before woman, average birth spacing of woman's
siblings, interaction of fraction born before and average birth spacing. (2) Child Mortality Determinants: number of sibling births in which the birth spacing was less than 24 months, proportion of siblings
that are male, woman's height as percent of median, proportion of siblings born before woman's marriage who died before age 5, number of pre-marriage young sibling deaths, number of siblings born
before woman's marriage. Household Characteristics : fixed effects for wealth index, and one indicator each for electricity, TV, and radio possession. Couple Characteristics : years of education each for woman
and husband, Muslim and Christian indicator each for husband and woman, indicators for husband's occupation categories, indicator for woman has been in multiple unions, indicators each for husband and
woman for whether they identify the relationship as married or just living together, indicator for couple is in a polygamous union, indicators for relationship to head of household each for husband and
woman. 
Woman's Natal Family, Household, 
and Couple Vars.
Additional Covariates For All Panels
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
     0.025***     0.033***     0.038***     0.037***



































Couple FE Y Y Y Y Y
Country by Year FE Y Y Y Y Y
N 207,208 207,208 207,208 207,208 207,208
Man's Stock of Sons in Year t
Deaths * Man's Stock of Daughters in Year t
Man's Stock of Daughters in Year t
Number of Post-Marriage Siblings Deaths up to t-1:  10 
Years Old and Under
Deaths * (Man Ideal Number of Children -  Woman 
Ideal Number of Children)
Deaths * Man's Stock of Sons in Year t
Woman Gives Birth in Year t  (0/1)
Table 3.5: Effect of Young Sibling Deaths on Probability of Giving Birth
Standard errors clustered at the couple level in parentheses.  All regressions represent linear probability estimates.  All regressions contain controls 
for the couple's ages and age-squared, an indicator for whether the woman gave birth in the last year, and the total stock of children and squared for 














(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Number of Post-Marriage 
Siblings Deaths up to t-1 :
 0.014*** 0.020*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.014*** 0.022*** 0.023** 0.018*
(0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
0.003 0.007
(0.006) (0.005)
0.010** 0.015** 0.017** 0.015** 0.010** 0.017** 0.012 0.011
(0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
0.003 0.006
(0.005) (0.004)
0.016** 0.016 0.018* 0.017 0.019*** 0.022** 0.014 0.071**
(0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.015) (0.007) (0.011) (0.013) (0.035)
0.014 0.020**
(0.010) (0.010)
0.012** 0.012 0.016* 0.017 0.014** 0.018* 0.008 0.064**
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.006) (0.010) (0.011) (0.025)
0.011 0.014*
(0.008) (0.008)
Woman gave birth last year Y Y Y Y Y Y
Husband age, age
2
 in year t Y Y Y
Stock of children variables Y Y Y Y Y Y
Child mortality variables Y Y Y
Stock of siblings variables Y Y Y
Couple FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Woman's age FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year of marriage FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country by year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Ctry by yr by woman age FE Y
Village by year FE Y
Woman by age-decade FE Y
N (Panel A and B) 207,208 207,208 207,208 207,208 207,208 207,208 207,208 207,208
N (Panel C) 17,738 17,738 17,738 17,738 17,738 17,738 17,738 17,738
N (Panel D) 26,492 26,492 26,492 26,492 26,492 26,492 26,492 26,492
10 Years Old and Under
Under 20 Years Old
10 Yr Old or Under Sibling 
Deaths of Other Villagers
Table 3.6: Effect of Young Sibling Deaths on Probability of Giving Birth
Woman Gives Birth in Year t  (0/1)
Panel A:  Deaths of Siblings 10 Years Old and Under
Standard errors clustered at the couple level in parentheses.  All regressions represent linear probability estimates.              
* significant at 10%;  ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Covariates For All Panels
Panel D:  Only Women Ever Had Post-Marriage Deaths of Siblings Under 20
Panel C: Only Women Ever Had Post-Marriage Deaths of Siblings 10 and 
Under
Panel B:  Deaths of Siblings Under 20 Years Old
Under 20 Years Old
Under 20 Yrs Old Sibling 
Deaths of Other Villagers
Under 20 Yrs Old Sibling 
Deaths of Other Villagers
10 Years Old and Under
10 Yr Old or Under Sibling 
Deaths of Other Villagers
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
-0.004 -0.014 -0.020 -0.018 -0.004 -0.020 -0.014 -0.007
(0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.029)
0.007 0.007 -0.004 0.003 0.007 -0.004 0.008 0.022
(0.019) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.019) (0.020) (0.024) (0.028)
0.020 0.022 0.011 0.013 0.020 0.011 0.021 0.024
(0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.024) (0.026)
0.001 0.007 -0.006 -0.007 0.001 -0.006 0.017 0.023
(0.016) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.023) (0.023)
-0.001 -0.004 -0.017 -0.014 -0.001 -0.017 0.008 0.006
(0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.022) (0.022)
0.003 -0.003 -0.012 -0.009 0.002 -0.009 0.011 0.009
(0.014) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.022) (0.021)
0.055*** 0.025 0.016 0.019 0.055*** 0.016 0.033 0.035*
(0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.022) (0.021)
0.012 0.015 0.005 0.007 0.012 0.005 0.026 0.032
(0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.022) (0.020)
0.031* 0.026 0.016 0.016 0.031* 0.016 0.036 0.045**
(0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.022) (0.021)
0.013 0.019 0.009 0.009 0.013 0.009 0.032 0.037*
(0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.021) (0.020)
-0.003 0.001 -0.008 -0.007 -0.003 -0.008 0.017 0.001
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.021) (0.019)
0.021* 0.031* 0.023 0.024 0.021* 0.023 0.060** 0.046**




Woman gave birth last year Y Y Y Y Y Y
Husband age, age
2
 in year t Y Y Y
Stock of children variables Y Y Y Y Y Y
Child mortality variables Y Y Y
Stock of siblings variables Y Y Y
Woman FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Woman's age FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year of marriage FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country by year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Ctry by yr by woman age FE Y
Village by year FE Y
Woman by age-decade FE Y
N 207,208 207,208 207,208 207,208 207,208 207,208 207,208 207,208
Standard errors clustered at the couple level in parentheses.  All regressions represent linear probability estimates.  * 
significant at 10%;  ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%








Woman Gives Birth in Year t  (0/1)Post-marriage 10 yr old or under 
young sibling deaths leads and lags:
Deatht - 4
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